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ABSTRACT 
Many problems facing policymakers are complex and cannot be understood by reducing them to 
their component parts. However, many of the policy responses to complex problems continue to 
be based on simple, reductionist methods. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is one alternative 
method for informing policy that is well-suited to analyzing complex problems.   
ABM has practical implications for different stages of the policy process, such as testing 
alternatives, assisting with evaluation by setting up a counterfactual, and agenda setting. The 
objective of the research presented in this dissertation is to explore the opportunity for using 
ABM to examine complex problems of relevance for policy. To do so, three separate models 
were developed to investigate different aspects of food safety inspection systems. Complex 
problems involve interrelated feedback loops, many actors, exponential growth, asymmetric 
information, and uncertainty in outcomes and data, and food safety exhibits these traits, 
providing an interesting case study for the use of ABM.  
The first model explores three inspection scenarios incorporating access to information. The 
main finding was that the number of sick consumers is greatly reduced by giving consumers and 
inspectors more information about whether a retail outlet is contaminated, even if that 
information may be uncertain. The second model incorporated theories on risk and the role of 
transparency in encouraging consumer trust by giving consumers access to inspection scores.  
Overall, the findings were more nuanced: having access to restaurant inspection scores results in 
a slightly higher mean number of sick consumers, but less variation overall in the number of sick 
consumers.  As well, a greater number of compliant restaurants results in fewer sick consumers. 
Rather than investigating the structure of the inspection system, the third model examines the 
potential for mobile technology to crowdsource information about suspected foodborne illness. 
This model illustrates the potential for health-oriented mobile technologies to improve the 
surveillance system for foodborne illness.  
Overall, the findings from the three models support using stylized ABMs to study various 
aspects of food safety inspection systems, and show that these models can be used to generate 
insight for policy choices and evidence-based decision making in this area. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 AGENT-BASED MODELING AND THE POLICY CYCLE 
1.1 Introduction 
Many problems facing policymakers are complex: they cannot be understood by reducing them 
to their component parts. However, many of the policy responses to complex problems continue 
to be based on simple, reductionist methods. Agent-based modeling (ABM), a type of 
computational simulation modeling that focuses on the system-wide effects caused by 
autonomous agent interaction, is one alternative method for informing policy that is well-suited 
to managing complex problems.   
ABM has practical implications for different stages of the policy process – testing alternatives, 
assisting with evaluation by setting up a counterfactual and even agenda setting. While these 
aspects have not been fully explored, the method has been touted as having great potential for 
policy (Moss, 2008).  This dissertation applies ABM to the policy area of food safety, which 
exhibits many aspects of complex problems, including interrelated feedback loops, many 
informally and formally organized actors, exponential increases in trade, asymmetric 
information, and uncertainty in outcomes and data. Chapters two, three and four examine some 
of these aspects in more detail by applying stylized ABMs to various aspects of food safety 
inspection systems, with the intent of generating insight for policy choices and evidence-based 
decision making in this area.  
This introductory chapter discusses complex problems, the relevance of ABM to policy 
problems, some of the advantages or disadvantages of the method, as well as ways ABMs can 
better be applied to policy and made relevant to policymakers. Finally, some of the aspects of 
food safety that make it a complex problem will be further explored, and the overall structure of 
the remainder of the dissertation will be outlined. 
1.2 Complex Problems in Public Policy  
Many of today’s persistent policy issues, such as nuclear power, infrastructure planning, poverty, 
and food safety, seem to end up back on the agenda fairly frequently – they are settled, but never 
solved. These problems share the common characteristics of complex or ‘wicked’ problems.  
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Wicked problems have a number of important traits; for instance, the information required “to 
understand the problem depends upon one’s idea for solving it” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 161). 
Generally, while trying to define a complex problem, solutions work their way into the problem 
definition. As such, complex problems are subject to competing problem frames and ‘causal 
stories’ (Stone, 1989). Additionally, wicked problems are never truly solved; any stopping rule is 
external to the problem itself (such as a lack of time or money, or changes in risk perception or 
values). Learning how to solve a wicked problem through trial and error is not feasible since 
trials cannot be reversed; every decision leaves its mark on the problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
This also means that the solutions applied to wicked problems often result in unintended 
consequences.  
Wicked problems1 are interconnected problems: “Problems can be described as discrepancies 
between the state of affairs as it is and the state as it ought to be. The process of resolving the 
problem starts with the search for causal explanation of the discrepancy. Removal of that cause 
poses another problem of which the original problem is a ‘symptom’” (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 
165). King (1993) clarifies Rittel and Webber’s work through a discussion of a range of problem 
types, ranging from tame, to ‘messes’ to wicked problems. Tame problems are those that can be 
solved in “relative isolation from other problems” whereas messes cannot be solved in isolation 
(King, 1993, p. 106). The need to adopt a broad, cross-cutting view of problems also conflicts 
with the typical organization of governments into specific departments, and is particularly 
problematic in federal systems where jurisdiction constrains the actions of different levels of 
government into specific areas of responsibility.  
Policy systems are set up to address well-structured problems and are assumed to deliver clear, 
well-defined options derived from the application of consistent rules (H. A. Simon, 1997); 
however, if the pressing policy issues facing decision-makers are wicked problems, these 
                                                 
1 In another typology of problems, Hoppe (2011, p. 16) defines problems as “a deviation between an existing state 
(‘is’) and a desirable one (‘ought’),” which is a fundamentally normative viewpoint. He has developed a typology of 
problem structures that incorporates fully structured problems, where both the knowledge required to understand the 
problem and the values and norms that define the problem are agreed upon by stakeholders; unstructured problems, 
where there is little agreement on norms and values or on available knowledge; and moderately structured problems, 
where there is either agreement on norms and goals defining a desired outcome but knowledge is uncertain (ends), 
or where knowledge is certain but there is wide divergence on norms and values (means) (Hoppe, 2011, pp. 16, 73–
4). 
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assumptions are inaccurate, and may lead to unintended consequences if pursued to their logical 
conclusion.  
1.3 Tools for Approaching Complex Problems 
Many areas that are especially prone to complexity, such as transportation, environmental issues, 
and health care, fall under the purview of provincial jurisdiction in Canada; these are also areas 
with some federal involvement, which further contributes to complexity in the division of 
responsibilities and decision-making. Recent work by Howlett and Newman (2010) indicates that 
provincial policy analysts expressed a preference for informal analytical techniques over formal 
ones, a finding that is consistent with previous work which found that simple policy analysis 
tools were preferred by both the producers and consumers of analytical work (Nilsson et al., 
2008 as cited in Howlett & Newman, 2010). In their survey of provincial public servants, 
Howlett and Newman (2010) found that the most commonly practiced techniques2 were 
brainstorming, consultation exercises and checklists, which are less formal, more subjective 
methods of analysis. Of the more formal analytical methods, the most commonly used were cost 
benefit analysis, scenario analysis, risk analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and financial impact 
analysis. The development of sophisticated modeling tools, which would presumably include 
such methods as regression models, was only used by 11.2% of respondents.  
However, as King (1993) notes, issues can arise when decision makers frame messes as tame 
problems and use tame methods for solving them, because the methods used to cope with tame 
problems are very different from those required to handle messes. Tame methods are analytical 
and involve breaking down issues into their component parts and assessing known failure 
sequences, which is highly effective with simple problems but often ineffective or dangerous 
when dealing with complex problems. Messes must be sorted out by taking a broader view and 
focusing on processes and feedback loops. As stated by King, “Messes demand a commitment to 
understanding how things going on here-and-now interact with other things going on there-and-
later” (King, 1993, p. 106).  Dealing with messes is challenging, given the limits of human 
cognition and prediction. As we deal with problems that are increasingly complex, and involve 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, many of the methods listed (although some were infrequently used), including brainstorming, 
scenario analysis, social network analysis, Monte Carlo techniques, decision trees,  problem mapping, and 
robustness or sensitivity analysis, could play a role in participatory model development and the modeling cycle. 
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the voices and input of numerous stakeholders that are both formally and informally organized, 
specific methods that are uniquely suited to dealing with these challenging characteristics of 
complexity should be applied to the policy space. One such method is agent-based modeling 
(ABM).   
1.4 Overview of Agent-based Modeling 
A model is “a purposeful representation of some real system” (Starfield et al., 1990, as cited by 
Railsback & Grimm, 2012, p. 4) that can be manipulated to answer specific questions. In 
neoclassical economic models, initial equations are generally based on assumptions that rational 
actors optimize their behaviour, given their current constraints, information, and available 
options. Because of computational constraints, modellers tend to use averages, rather than a 
range of representative agents, and other assumptions, such as systems seeking equilibrium, are 
incorporated. This type of modeling is top down, in that high-level rules are imposed on the 
system, and then we look for the implications and effects of those rules. In contrast, agent-based 
models simplify the behaviour of individuals within the system, and allow the agents to interact. 
This type of modeling is bottom up, because system behaviour is caused by the interactions of 
individual agents (Miller & Page, 2007, pp. 65–66). As neatly summarized by Miller and Page 
(2007, p. 66), “Thus, in top down modeling we abstract broadly over the entire behavior of the 
system, whereas in bottom up modeling we focus our abstractions over the lower-level individual 
entities that make up the system.”  
ABMs are generally computer simulations that include many agents interacting with one another 
and their environment to reveal emergent properties (G. T. Jones, 2007). Emergence is present 
when the phenomena can only be described using terms that cannot be appropriately applied to 
the component parts of the system. Social phenomena, such as the spread of rumours or diseases, 
often exhibit emergent properties, given the non-linear relationships between actors within the 
system that affect the actors’ subsequent behaviour. Agents within the model are programmed 
using collections of rules so that they are able to perceive their environment, react to it, and 
communicate with other agents (Gilbert, 2004). As well, ABMs must be carefully specified and 
assumptions must be clearly evaluated in order for the model to adequately represent a social 
system. As such, models represent a trade-off between flexibility and precision (Miller & Page, 
2007, p. 79).   
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Simon’s (1955) seminal work on bounded rationality introduces satisficing as a feasible 
alternative to rational choice theory’s assumptions, which require a significant amount of 
information and computational capacity. Simon (1955, p. 104) states that “there is a complete 
lack of evidence that, in actual human choice situations of any complexity, these computations 
can be, or are in fact, performed.” Satisficing involves individuals holding an aspiration level, 
which defines a satisfactory outcome that can adjust as new information is processed. Rather 
than requiring an optimal decision, which would require fixed preferences and a complete 
ordering of possibilities, aspiration levels can go down if the decision-maker has difficulty in 
finding satisfactory alternatives, or increase if satisfactory options are easy to find. By using 
straightforward behavioural rules, ABMs can model decision-making in a more realistic manner.  
 ABMs provide an opportunity to use experimental methods on social phenomena that have very 
long time horizons or where experimentation would be unethical (Louie & Carley, 2008). These 
models are well suited for  modeling complex systems, where “the behaviour of the system as a 
whole cannot be determined by partitioning it and understanding the behaviour of each of the 
parts separately, which is the classic strategy of the reductionist physical sciences” (Gilbert, 
2004, p. 3). Although models may be used for predictive purposes, this is not their only function: 
ABMs may be employed to guide data collection, look for explanations of phenomena within a 
system, demonstrate trade-offs between alternatives, or generate new questions (Epstein, 2008). 
A number of authors have indicated that simulation and ABMs, as a specific type of simulation, 
represent a “third way” of doing science: Axelrod (2003, p. 5) mentions,  
like deduction, it starts with a set of explicit assumptions. But unlike deduction, it does 
not prove theorems. Instead, a simulation generates data that can be analyzed inductively. 
Unlike typical induction, however, the simulated data comes from a rigorously specified 
set of rules rather than direct measurement of the real world. While induction can be used 
to find patterns in data, and deduction can be used to find consequences of assumptions, 
simulation modeling can be used as an aid in intuition. 
 These statements are echoed by Epstein (1999, p. 44), who describes agent-based modeling as a 
method appropriate for ‘generative social science.’ Axelrod (2003, p. 5) further argues that most 
modeling in the social sciences is informed by rational choice theory because it allows for 
deduction, not because many scholars feel that its assumptions accurately represent human 
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behaviour. Adaptive behaviour requires simulation if it is to be a viable alternative, because the 
outcomes of adaptation cannot be deduced – this means that ABM fits in between deduction and 
induction ABM offers an opportunity to relax the assumptions of rational choice theory to more 
realistically model how individuals make decisions.  
1.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of ABM 
Some of the advantages of ABM follow from its unusual position as a method that straddles 
induction and deduction. Bankes (2002, p. 7199) mentions that researchers are often enthusiastic 
about ABMs  because they allow for departure from the restrictive assumptions of other 
modeling techniques, namely linearity, homogeneity, statistical normality, and stationarity.  
ABM’s ability to deal with heterogeneous populations that can be informed by individual data, 
rather than aggregate data, is a unique feature with strong application to policy issues, since 
many policies focus on encouraging individuals to change their choices and behaviour. 
Agent-based models offer a few distinct advantages. Bonabeau (2002, p. 7280) identifies three 
benefits of ABMs: firstly, they capture emergence; secondly, they provide a natural, bottom up 
description of a system; and thirdly, the method is very flexible. However, the author notes that 
the main benefit of capturing emergent phenomena largely powers the other two. Bankes (2002, 
p. 7199) also refers to the natural ability of ABMs to represent social systems due to the central 
place of agents within the system. Much social science is focused at the individual level, 
reflecting individual preferences, motivations for behaviour, and relationships; as well, policies 
often rest on individual choices and coordinating behaviours for system-level outcomes 
(Schneider & Ingram, 1990). Patt and Siebenhuener (2005) point out that the inclusion of social 
norms is an important factor in human decision-making, and that they are left out of traditional 
system dynamics models – but can more easily be incorporated in ABM because they can be 
modeled as a rule that agents follow, although some authors have argued that doing so can be 
problematic (O’Sullivan & Haklay, 2000). A further advantage of ABM, as argued by Epstein 
(1999, p. 47), is that modeling provides a “natural methodology” for interdisciplinary research. 
Although the social sciences are organized into separate academic disciplines, within society, 
economics, demography, epidemiology, sociology, and policy are all linked. The SugarScape 
model, which is a very simple model that yields surprisingly complex results, provides an 
example of an artificial society where everything from economic markets to cultural adaptation 
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to virus transmission is included (Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Although these elements do not need 
to be incorporated all at once, “[t]he claim is that the new techniques allow us to transcend 
certain artificial boundaries that may limit our insight” (Epstein, 1999, p. 47).  
Although ABMs have distinct advantages for handling policy problems, they come with a unique 
set of challenges. Bankes (2002, p. 7199) notes that although ABM shows great promise for 
providing insights into social problems, uptake has been inhibited by a “lack of clarity about the 
uses of computational models and the requirements for credible arguments using them.” 
Bonabeau (2002, p. 7287) notes a number of possible issues with ABM. In particular, ABMs 
must be purpose-built; general models are not feasible. Determining the appropriate level of 
detail to incorporate into a model so that it tells the researcher something useful about the 
problem but has been simplified enough to be understandable is a difficult skill to master – 
Bonabeau (2002) notes that this is more of an art than a science. This can make it difficult to 
evaluate and compare ABMs against one another if they are not properly documented.  As well, 
the specification of models is very technical and can be complicated, and since the currently 
available software packages require coding skills, the implementation of ABM may be out of 
reach for some who wish to study a problem well suited to modeling but lack the coding skills to 
build a model. 
 Additionally, introducing the ‘potentially irrational’ choice behaviour of humans can be difficult 
to incorporate into models, since it can be problematic to quantify these aspects of decision-
making. There may also be difficulties in accessing appropriate individual-level data3 with which 
to inform model parameters, particularly as this method has not been widely used in the social 
sciences. Finally, Bonabeau (2002) introduces a practical issue: computing power. Although 
huge advances in computation capacity have been made in the decade since his paper was 
published, this is still a practical concern.4  
                                                 
3 Some very interesting research in this area is ongoing at the University of Saskatchewan, where researchers in the 
Department of Computer Science have developed an Android App called iEpi, purpose-built for accessing 
individual-level health data to inform ABMs (Mohammad Hashemian et al., 2012). 
4 Some of the issues related to computing power is for ‘parallel problems’ that can be spread between different 
computational units, such as separate cores, processors, or machines.   
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On a deeper level, O’Sullivan and Haklay (2000, p. 1413) critique the tendency of ABMs to lean 
towards methodological individualism. They note that although this may not be avoidable, it is 
often an unstated assumption.5 They are concerned this leads to a “one way notion of emergence: 
the social can emerge from the individual but not the other way around” (O’Sullivan & Haklay, 
2000, p. 1414). The failure of some ABMs to allow for the pre-existence of culture and social 
norms, which shape our actions, choices, and development as individuals is considered by the 
authors to be an “impoverished” view of society (O’Sullivan & Haklay, 2000). Lastly, a criticism 
of applying ABM within the policy space is that the bottom up nature of ABM may make it 
difficult to apply some top down structures, such as the economic, social and political aspects of 
public policies, in simulations, without embedding them into the individual agents. Modellers 
may cope with this by incorporating these structures within agents, which hides the influence of 
the overall system on the individual agents and limits the modeller’s ability to look at whether 
the agents influence these global structures over time  (Ghorbani, Dechesne, Dignum, & Jonker, 
2014, p. 70); another alternative is that these structures could be incorporated into the agent 
environment and could include environmental dynamics. These concerns are valid and should be 
investigated further in order to build models that adequately reflect the constraints and 
opportunities for human interaction and choice within social structures.  
1.6 ABM in Practice 
Given the preceding background on ABM as a methodology and the advantages and 
disadvantages of using it, a discussion is needed on the types of problems ABM is well-suited to 
examining and the documentation required to effectively explain, evaluate and compare ABMs.  
The process of building and testing models is both time and resource intensive, and it also 
requires individual data to inform the rules that agents follow. As such, it can be well-suited to 
solving problems that meet certain criteria, but may not be a good fit for all issues facing policy-
makers. ABM is well-suited for handling complex problems, often involving heterogeneous 
actors and linked systems, which would result in a large, expensive program or policy with high 
set up costs and where initial choices would be difficult or impossible to revise at a later point in 
                                                 
5 Methodological individualism is likely compounded by the tendency of modellers to focus on individual agents, 
rather than the relationships between agents. Modellers can alleviate this by thinking critically about the model’s 
scope and key indicators.  
9 
 
time. For example, there have been some ABMs examining transportation infrastructure and 
comparing the results with other types of modelling (Doniec, Mandiau, Piechowak, & Espie, 
Stephane, 2008). Placing a new road, intersection or bridge in the wrong location could be an 
exceptionally expensive endeavour that cannot be undone, so an initial investment of time and 
money into building an ABM to investigate different options could be money well-spent.  
As well, programs or policies that depend on the behaviour of individuals to be successful can be 
modeled using ABM. For example, Chen and Zhan (2008) conducted a study comparing staged 
and simultaneous evacuation strategies using an ABM – the method was particularly well-suited 
to this problem because it depends both on the behaviour of individuals, so a model based on 
individuals is a natural fit, and because the stakes are too high to ‘learn from experience’ in this 
case. Evacuations tend to be uncommon, and  if one evacuation strategy is substantially better 
than another given the population density and road network of a given city, emergency 
management staff want to have this information ahead of time so it can be incorporated into 
plans and communicated.   
These two facets are not necessarily mutually exclusive; ABMs may be most useful when both 
the program would be expensive to set up and difficult to change, and when its success hinges on 
individuals complying with a certain kind of behaviour. Food safety in retail outlets is a problem 
that exhibits both of these traits, which is why it was chosen as the case study for the remainder 
of this dissertation. 
As noted above, one of the disadvantages of ABMs is that they can be difficult to compare and 
re-implement models if they are not properly documented. Following discussions within the field 
for a more systematic means of documenting ABMs (Richiardi, Leombruni, Saam, & Sonnessa, 
2006), the Overview, Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol was developed (Grimm et 
al., 2010). The ODD protocol is designed to facilitate model replication by other researchers, as 
well as improve reader understanding by explaining models in a concise, complete and consistent 
way.  
The ODD begins by describing the purpose of the model; the entities, state variables, and scales 
used; and an overview of the processes in the model and their scheduling. The design concepts 
section covers basic principles, emergence, adaptation, objectives, learning, prediction, sensing, 
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interaction between agents, stochasticity or randomness, any collectives used, and observation6 – 
the data that comes out of the model. The details section focuses on initialization, any input data 
that is incorporated, and describing in detail the submodels within the model (Railsback & 
Grimm, 2012). The ODD forces the researcher to carefully think through all of the model’s key 
assumptions and document them, which both aids in the formulation of the model and in 
communicating it to others. As such, the ODD is a key element of transparency in model-
building; this transparency is important when building models using input from stakeholders, 
including policy-makers. 
1.7 ABM and the Policy Process 
Policy-making is fundamentally a deliberative, discursive process where actors operating under 
resource, time, and search constraints identify policy problems, articulate goals, make choices to 
match solutions involving policy tools to problems, and assess whether or not these goals have 
been met through evaluation (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p. 4). Thus, policy-making 
incorporates both technical and political dimensions – the technical side defines which tools are 
best suited to addressing problems, whereas the political side deals with how the problem is 
framed, often involving competing interests and causal theories from different stakeholder 
groups (Stone, 1989), what kinds of tools are considered socially acceptable, and what types of 
knowledge are considered legitimate (Howlett et al., 2009). Implementing policies is complex, 
especially when dealing with wicked problems, because complexity limits our ability to predict 
and control outcomes in social systems which increases the significance of unintended 
consequences of policy actions (Sanderson, 2002). A further aspect of complexity in achieving 
policy goals, as noted by Schneider and Ingram (1990, p. 513), “public policy almost always 
attempts to get people to do things that they might not have done otherwise. For policies to have 
the intended impacts on society, a large number of people in different situations must make 
decisions and take actions in concert with policy objectives.” The role of individual choices in 
achieving desired policy outcomes via the application of policy tools to change behaviour is 
emphasized here. Given the importance of individual learning, choices, perceptions and 
                                                 
6 For a detailed list of key questions related to each design concept, see Railsback & Grimm, 2012, p. 41. 
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preferences in achieving system-level outcomes, ABM has great potential for generating insights 
in the policy process.  
The policy process is a conceptual model that simplifies policymaking by dividing it into discrete 
steps. The five step model is most commonly used (see Figure 1.1). The cycle begins with 
agenda-setting, where problems are brought to the attention of governments, then policy 
formulation, which involves devising policy alternatives, decision-making, where one of those 
alternatives is selected, implementation, where the chosen alternative is implemented, and 
evaluation, where the extent to which the policy outcomes match the policy goal is evaluated. 
The results of that evaluation, which may be undertaken by either the government itself or by 
outside actors, may contribute to adjustments or termination of the policy (Howlett et al., 2009). 
The advantage of breaking the policy process down into this series of steps is that it allows for 
better understanding and theory building of the overall process, and it is general enough that it 
can be used at all levels of government (Howlett et al., 2009), and by policy analysts to guide 
them in their work (Bridgman & Davis, 2003). The disadvantage of the policy cycle model is 
that it may appear that policy analysis proceeds in a linear fashion, although in reality the process 
is iterative and steps may be repeated. The policy process is not a causal theory; policy-making is 
embedded in a broader social and political context. As noted by Bridgman and Davis (2003, p. 
100), “A policy cycle is just a heuristic, an ideal type from which every reality will curve away.” 
The following section will examine the potential application of ABM to each stage of the policy 
process.  
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Figure 1.1 The policy cycle 
 
Agenda-setting: The agenda-setting process “is concerned with the way problems emerge, or 
not, as candidates for government’s attention. What happens at this early stage of the policy 
process has a decisive impact on the entire subsequent policy cycle and its outcomes” (Howlett 
et al., 2009, p. 92). Recognizing problems is not a neutral process. Difficulties need to be 
recognized as responsive to human intervention in order to be seen as problems, otherwise they 
are viewed as accidents or the work of nature (Stone, 1989, p. 281). Once problems have been 
framed into the realm of human involvement, the way they are defined shapes how they are 
approached and what solutions are viewed as viable: “Problem definition is a process of image 
making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame and 
responsibility” (Stone, 1989, p. 282). Causal theories factor into problem definition, and often, 
different stakeholders will advance competing causal stories. Successful causal theories are 
powerful: they can challenge the established social order or protect the status quo, assign 
responsibility for the problem, empower certain stakeholders and their solutions, and create new 
political relationships amongst those who have been harmed (Stone, 1989, p. 295). 
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Stone discusses complex systems, but describes complexity stories as weak from a causal point 
of view because such systems involve so many actors and interactions that breakdowns are 
inevitable, and it is impossible to assign blame to any one actor for these failures. However, 
ABM can be used to make failures associated with complexity stories clearer by articulating 
causal pathways, with the possibility for assigning responsibility for system breakdowns.7 As 
well, science can be a powerful asset to those stakeholders who are advancing or refuting a 
causal theory. ABM, with its roots in Computer Science and its ability to incorporate real data as 
well as assumptions about how the world works, could potentially be used by policy 
entrepreneurs to show support for a specific causal theory.  
Policy formulation: Policy formulation, the second stage in the policy cycle, “refers to the 
process of generating options on what to do about a public problem” (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 
110). Formulation can be divided into four sub-stages. Firstly, the appraisal phase considers data 
and evidence on the identified policy problem and possible solutions. Secondly, the dialogue 
phase initiates communication and consultation between governments and other stakeholders and 
policy actors on potential solutions. Thirdly, governments weigh the evidence and draft a 
proposal in the formulation phase. Fourthly, feedback on the proposal and specific 
recommendations on a policy option to pursue will be generated in the consolidation phase 
(Howlett et al., 2009, pp. 111–112). Exploring these alternative courses of action and deciding 
which to take depends on both technical and political constraints. A specific policy option may 
be a reasonable idea for addressing the defined problem, but if it is politically unpalatable, it will 
not be accepted by government (Blakeney & Borins, 1998).  
Once an initial feasibility assessment is complete, there is clear potential for ABM to examine 
different policy tools and alternatives. Policy tools are the specific instruments that government 
uses to achieve policy goals, and policy goals will not be reached unless “target populations … 
comply with policy directives, utilize policy opportunities when these are offered, or engage in 
other forms of coproduction to promote socially desired results” (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 
527). Different policy tools are designed to induce different behaviour in targeted individuals:  
                                                 
7 See Goldstein, 2011 for a preliminary effort to simulate the causal pathways of the 2008 financial crisis.  
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 Authority tools rely on the legitimacy of governments to induce behaviour;  
 Incentive tools, such as inducements and sanctions, assume that individuals maximize 
their utility and will change their behaviour in order to do so;   
 Capacity tools assume that individuals rely on heuristics because they lack information, 
and will make better decisions if given that information;  
 Symbolic tools assume intrinsic motivation, and manipulate symbols and values to induce 
the desired behaviour; and learning tools are more flexible and assume that targets do not 
know what they should do or what their options are; and  
 Policy tools should promote learning (Schneider & Ingram, 1990).  
Because these tools employ different assumptions about the nature of human behaviour and the 
best way to encourage behavioural change in order to meet policy goals at the global level, the 
focus of ABM on individual agents and their choices makes this method a natural fit for 
examining different policy tools and their emergent, system-wide effects.  
An ABM could be developed to test the application of the different policy tools listed above and 
their effects on agent behaviour. Following an initial testing of policy tools using such a model, 
these results could be used in the dialogue phase to engage with stakeholders and get their input 
on policy options, and to further improve the model. This phase may also allow for expert 
consultation, which is often needed to get the subject specific information and data required to 
build a grounded ABM. However, building and testing ABMs, then refining them to better 
reflect assumptions and key agent behaviour, requires a substantial input of time which may not 
be feasible at the earliest stages of policy formulation.  
Because ABMs require a lot of time to build and test, they are likely to be most useful at the 
formulation and consolidation phases of policy formulation. Following the dialogue phase, the 
preferred options could be simulated and the results may be useful in determining which option 
should be pursued and determining initial policy settings. A further advantage of ABM is that it 
can be used in areas where there are little empirical data, and thus may offer new insights for 
novel policy instruments. Sanderson (2002) critiques policy pilot projects that are actually 
prototypes, where prototyping emphasizes how the initiative worked, rather than whether or not 
it worked. Because ABMs are built with flexible parameters and many repeated simulations can 
be run quickly, ABMs can be subject to analyses to determine initial conditions that are most 
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amenable to success over many replications. This attribute has the potential to allow 
policymakers to focus on ‘prototyping’ in silico to get initial conditions closer to success, and 
then focus on setting up pilot projects for longer term evaluations where the focus is on whether 
or not the initiative was successful. 
Decision-making: The decision-making stage is where an option from the previous stage is 
approved and advanced in either a formal or informal statement indicating the government’s 
intent to proceed (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 139). Decisions can either be positive, in that they alter 
the status quo, or negative, in that they maintain the status quo. Negative decisions halt the 
policy cycle at this stage. Importantly, the decision-making stage is inherently political, and 
inevitably involves winners and losers, even if the status quo is maintained. The main role for 
ABM at this stage in the policy process would be to add to the evidence base for choosing which 
alternative to implement, as noted above.  
Implementation: The implementation stage is comprised of “[t]he effort, knowledge, and 
resources devoted to translating policy decisions into action” (Howlett et al., 2009, p. 160). The 
main role for ABM in implementation would be to assist bureaucrats with determining initial 
policy settings. Initially, using models can show a level of needed resources in order to have an 
effect, and sensitivity analyses can be conducted to show where the boundaries of that effect are. 
This could assist with implementing a more efficient policy from the beginning, and potentially 
resulting in less iteration between evaluation and implementation to get the policy settings 
‘right.’  
The tractability of the problem and the severity of the constraints facing government are also key 
factors affecting implementation. When practical constraints are low and the problem is 
relatively clearly defined and solvable, full implementation can be achieved. However, when the 
problem is intractable but constraints are low, policy experimentation may occur. High 
constraints and tractable problems experience contested implementation, where stakeholders 
continue to vie for resources to solve the problem. Intractable problems facing high constraints 
experience symbolic implementation. To overcome constraints, policymakers can increase their 
capacity for monitoring and forecasting in order to develop better policies (Howlett et al., 2009, 
pp. 175–176). ABM could play a role in this process by incorporating monitoring data into a 
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simulation that could then experiment with changes to policy implementation or different policy 
instruments.  
A further application of ABM to implementation research could come through the 
operationalization of ‘backward mapping’ (Elmore, 1979). Forward mapping begins with a clear 
statement of the policy’s objective and then describes a set of steps for achieving it, and defines 
an outcome for measuring success or failure. The forward mapping perspective emphasizes 
centralized control, consistent adherence to standards, and a focus on factors such as budget 
allocation that are easily controlled by policymakers. Elmore (1979, p. 603) points out that the 
weakness of this approach is that it assumes that policy implementation is controlled in a top 
down way. Top down approaches are not well suited to handling complexity or the ‘messiness’ 
of policy-making (Schofield, 2001). 
Forward mapping is contrasted with backward mapping, which begins “at the point at which 
administrative actions intersect private choices” (Elmore, 1979, p. 604). By beginning with a 
description of behaviour at the end of the implementation process that policy should affect, 
backward mapping questions the assumptions that policymakers control implementation from the 
top. Once the behaviour has been described, an objective is stated from an organizational 
operations standpoint, and then desired outcomes are described. Bottom up approaches pay 
attention to the actions and motives of actors in the policy system (Schofield, 2001). Importantly, 
the backward mapping approach, in contrast to forward mapping, disperses control and focuses 
on factors over which policymakers have little influence, such as incentive structures, bargaining 
relationships, and knowledge of administrators (Elmore, 1979). Backward-mapping focuses on 
problem-solving processes, rather than outputs, and views discretion and adaptive behaviour by 
lower level administrators as valuable for policy learning. Since ABM is well-suited to 
incorporating adaptive behaviour and heterogeneity of agents, the method is a natural fit for 
exploring the backward mapping approach.     
Evaluation: Policy evaluation is the stage of the policy cycle that “assesses the effectiveness of 
a public policy in terms of its perceived intentions and results” (Gerston, 1997, p. 120, as cited 
by Howlett et al., 2009, p. 178). Following evaluation, the problems, solutions and policy options 
involved may be revised, which re-starts the policy cycle, the policy may continue unchanged, or 
it may be judged a complete success or failure and the policy cycle may be terminated (Howlett 
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et al., 2009). Although some scholars present a normative view that broader policy analysis 
should remain separate from the more rational, objective task of evaluation (Geva-May & Pal, 
1999), others argue that evaluation maintains a political element and its results are open to 
judgment, interpretation and re-framing – policy successes may come to be viewed as failures 
over time, and vice versa (Bovens & ’t Hart, 1996).  
A new focus on evaluating outcomes came from reforms under the New Public Management 
(NPM) paradigm of public administration which included an emphasis on performance 
measurement, improving quality while reducing costs, and improving accountability (Borins, 
2002). In the UK and New Zealand, NPM was inspired by public choice theory, which assumes 
that bureaucrats are self-interested, rational actors, and agency theory, which focuses on 
principal-agent relationships where the agent makes decisions that impact the principal. The 
agency dilemma occurs because the agent is motivated to act in his own interests, not those of 
the principal, because of information asymmetry. ABMs can be used to represent principal-agent 
problems,8 and it is straightforward to model information asymmetry; the models described in 
later chapters of this thesis include information asymmetry, although not in a principal-agent 
context. Despite the emphasis that some NPM reformers placed on evidence-based learning, 
reforms were not always informed by evidence (Hood & Peters, 2004).  
Although governments have come to value improved efficiency and effectiveness (Hood, 1991), 
and place an emphasis on building the evidence base for public policy by explaining “what 
works for whom in what circumstances,” which “relies on the assumption that we can make 
policies work better if we understand how policy mechanisms bring about change in social 
systems to achieve desired outcomes” (Sanderson, 2002, p. 2). This process of examining what 
works, for whom, and why and adapting it to a new context is referred to as lesson drawing 
(Rose, 2005). As the social space in which policies are implemented has grown increasingly 
complex, the need for effective monitoring and evaluation to provide feedback and allow for 
policy course corrections has grown. Under these circumstances, “a major burden is placed upon 
policy experimentation and evaluation as key institutional practices in interactive governance to 
                                                 
8 It should be emphasized that although ABM can be used to represent theories of involving rational actors, one of 
the strengths of the method is that rationality is not required.  
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provide the basis for reflexive social learning” (Sanderson, 2002, p. 9). Although Sanderson 
highlights the role of pilot projects in policy experimentation and evaluation, this is also an area 
where ABM could be beneficial.  
There are some significant barriers to successfully evaluating policy pilot projects. Policies often 
effect change slowly, particularly when enacted on a small scale, and measuring these small 
changes and attributing them to the pilot, not other factors, can be challenging. Political interests 
often run counter to those of evaluation, in that politicians want shorter pilot projects so that 
politically relevant policies can be fully implemented, whereas evaluation is better served by 
longer time horizons and in depth study (Sanderson, 2002, p. 11). Although randomized control 
trials have been attempted, it is impossible to design a true control: similar communities will 
have important differences and may be influenced by other factors over the course of the study 
period that researchers could not have anticipated. Ethical objections also arise from withholding 
benefits from eligible participants. Finally, researchers cannot control all aspects of policy 
implementation and there may be variation between contexts, particularly in initiatives that are 
specific to individual or group needs (Sanderson, 2002, p. 12).  
ABMs provide a potential solution to these difficulties of evaluation. ABMs are well suited to 
situations with long time horizons (Louie & Carley, 2008). Simulations can be run numerous 
times with the exact same initial conditions, avoiding the problem of reflexivity that is inherent 
in complex problems. Because simulations can be run many times and quickly, an ABM that 
represents the pilot project could give insight into the amount of time needed to see an effect, 
which could help policymakers convince political interests that a longer time horizon is needed 
for effective evaluation. An ABM could be constructed to show the environment without the 
pilot, to give evaluators a counterfactual and highlight differences between the simulation and 
data generated from the pilot, and to serve as an in silico control. If ABMs were employed to test 
different policy options during the formulation stage, these models could be updated and used in 
evaluation to advance policy learning, and further link the policy cycle with the modeling cycle.  
ABM has practical implications for different stages of the policy process, particularly in testing 
policy alternatives and policy evaluation,  which have not been fully explored even though the 
method has been touted as having great potential for policy development (Ghorbani et al., 2014; 
Moss, 2008). The discussion here has advanced this line of thought by illustrating potential areas 
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for ABMs to generate insight in the policy process. However, because ABM is a relatively new 
tool in the policy space, it must be made relevant and accessible to policymakers.  
1.8 How can ABM be made relevant to policymakers? 
Although ABM has been used in some policy areas, namely land use management and water 
demand, it has not been frequently applied as a public policy tool (Moss, 2008). Some other 
areas where ABM has been discussed in a policy-relevant way are infrastructure (Rinaldi, 2004)  
and health (Maglio & Mabry, 2011), which are also areas that generally fall under provincial 
jurisdiction. Provincial public servants tend to work on a fairly small subset of issues, and spend 
a great deal of their time ‘firefighting,’ or working on problems that require immediate attention. 
As well, provincial policy analysts tend to mostly be trained in the social sciences,9 with little 
training specific to policy analysis and little experience outside of government; they are ‘process 
related’ experts, without much expertise to devote to gathering and interpreting evidence in their 
specific subject areas (Howlett & Newman, 2010). Howlett and Newman (2010, p. 131) note that 
this preoccupation with firefighting, relative inexperience, and lack of substantive subject area 
and policy analysis training indicate that provincial policy analysts “may not have the capacity to 
practice a high level of evidence-based policy analysis and policy-making.” 
ABM has a great deal of applicability to various stages of the policy cycle, particularly in adding 
to the evidence base of policy formulation and policy evaluation. It is a method well suited to the 
study of complex problems, which often fall into the realm of provincial jurisdiction. Model 
building has its own cycle, consisting of formulating the question, assembling hypotheses, 
choosing the model structure, implementing the model, analyzing the model, and looking for 
patterns in between stages (Railsback & Grimm, 2012, p. 7).  
                                                 
9 Howlett & Newman (2010) found that only 1.6% of the provincial public servants they surveyed had a degree in 
Computing Science. 
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Figure 1.2 The modeling cycle 
 
As with the policy cycle, the modeling cycle is not a linear process (see Figure 1.2): modellers 
will often move back and forth between steps and repeat the cycle several times before finally 
leaving the cycle to communicate the model. The model building process, which has the 
potential to generate as many or more insights as the actual model, can be very time consuming. 
Although ABM has a great deal of potential for generating insights in policy development, 
policy analysts likely require specialized training to interpret the results of ABM research, and 
will not contract out for ABM studies nor use the results if they are unfamiliar with them or view 
them as too difficult to interpret. Governments value efficiency and emphasize outcomes (Hood, 
1991) and will not invest time and money on a time-consuming method for policy analysis, 
particularly one that falls outside of the comfort zone and training of its policy analysts, unless 
there is significant value for money. Although ABM shows great promise for generating insights 
on the policy process, researchers must make the results of these models accessible to 
policymakers in order for them to become an accepted tool for policy analysis. How can 
researchers make ABMs accessible to policymakers?  
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Stakeholder engagement: Firstly, researchers need to open the ‘black box’ of model building 
through collaboration. As other authors have noted, “it is frequently the case that policymakers 
dismiss academic research as too theoretical, unrelated to the actual problems they are wrestling 
with, or in other ways irrelevant to their concerns…” (Gilbert, 2002, as cited by Ramanath & 
Gilbert, 2004, para. 2.1). Collaboration between subject matter experts, technical modellers and 
policy analysts is essential. By involving stakeholders in the modeling cycle, the finished product 
will better address their needs for policy formulation and evaluation, and the researcher will 
likely need to do fewer revisions to the model.  
Stakeholder involvement10 is particularly crucial in formulating a clear research question, which 
can be especially challenging when dealing with complex problems. A key element of ABMs is 
that they be simplified as much as possible, only focusing on key elements needed to understand 
the system (Railsback & Grimm, 2012), and subject matter experts are often helpful in narrowing 
down potential hypotheses. Policy analysts as model stakeholders may not be directly involved 
in devising parameters and state variables for the entities in the model; however, a policy maxim 
is ‘what gets measured gets managed’ so their understanding of the system, what they are 
interested in managing, and what data is available could be of use here. Technical experts should 
manage the technical aspects of model parameterization, implementation and testing. Lastly, 
following analysis of the model’s output, stakeholder groups should be involved in a discussion 
on how to revise the model. A further advantage of participatory model building is that it gives 
researchers an opportunity to inform policymakers as to the limitations of the model so that 
expectations for what ABM can achieve are in line with reality, and also to provide training on 
how to understand models and their associated documentation. Ghorbani et al. (2014, p. 70) note 
that “[a]lthough simulation results can be communicated to problem owners to facilitate 
participatory decision making, building collaborative agent-based models is not a common 
process.” Researchers must make an effort to change this in order for ABMs to become more 
widely used in the policy space.  
                                                 
10 See Ramanath & Gilbert, 2004 for a discussion of lessons drawn from agent-based participatory simulation 
studies. 
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Model Transparency: Model transparency is important for policy-making for two reasons. 
Firstly, given the iterative nature of the policy cycle, evidence used to construct policy may be 
revisited by different stakeholders again at a later time, and these stakeholders may have 
competing problem frames and evidence to contribute to defining the policy problem, 
formulating policy alternatives, and evaluating the effectiveness of current policies. In order to 
use models in this feedback process, their assumptions must be documented in a clear and 
transparent way. Secondly, whether or not a model is used in policymaking, researchers must 
also maintain detailed model documentation for models to be accessible and transparent to 
outside audiences. The documentation for any model must be complete and clear to allow for 
model replication by other researchers and a thorough understanding of all assumptions and data 
used. One such method for documentation is the ODD framework, a standard framework for 
describing models so that they can be understood and replicated.  
Engaging policymakers in modeling and developing transparent models for policy problems is 
not simply a benevolent exercise for researchers. One of the difficulties of building ABMs is 
access to reliable, individually-based data to inform ABMs. Governments often collect a great 
deal of data for their own evaluation purposes, and researchers could potentially influence this 
data collection activity to better suit the needs of ABM if governments see the value of ABMs 
for evidence-based policy-making. Although the full potential of ABMs for policy-making has 
yet to be unlocked, there are certainly opportunities for them to add value if researchers and 
policymakers are open to collaboration. 
1.9 Specific Case Study of a Complex Problem: Food Safety 
The following section describes food safety, which serves as a case study of a complex problem. 
The Public Health Agency of Canada estimates that approximately 4 million people, or 1 in 8 
Canadians, become sick each year. There is a great deal of uncertainty as to the full extent 
foodborne illness because many cases are mild and those affected do not seek medical treatment, 
which contributes to underreporting. Of those who do seek treatment, laboratory testing is not 
always completed and cases may not be reported to the appropriate authorities (Buzby & 
Roberts, 2009; Schlundt, 2002). Further, the food product that causes the illness is not always 
known (Batz et al., 2005). The actual number of foodborne illness outbreaks is thought to have 
declined in recent years, but there has been an increase in the number of food recalls, which has 
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negatively impacted public trust (Kramer, Coto, & Weidner, 2005). The uncertainty associated 
with estimates of foodborne illness impedes the development of effective interventions and 
policies to prevent foodborne illnesses. 
Ensuring that safe food reaches consumers, from a regulatory perspective, is a semi-structured 
problem (Hoppe, 2011), as the outcome, safe food, is widely agreed upon, but our methods of 
achieving it are sometimes ineffective and not always agreed upon. For example, the use of 
growth-enhancing hormones in beef has been judged to be safe when used according to sound 
veterinary practices in Canada and the United States, but many of these same hormones are 
banned in beef production in the European Union, leading to trade disputes (Kerr & Hobbs, 
2005). However, some disagreement exists as to the definition of ‘safety’ and what constitutes 
safe food. Nestle (2010) notes that although microbial food contamination sickens and kills 
people each year, many consumers are more concerned about the  safety of genetic engineering, 
which has not sickened or killed anyone to date. Thus, viewing food safety from a broader 
systems perspective, it can be considered a complex problem – both the problem and the means 
of solving it are contested. 
The following section explores the interconnected changes in terms of animal, environmental, 
processing, and human factors that contribute to the complexity of food safety.   
Animal factors: There have been numerous changes in animal production that have been linked 
to emerging foodborne diseases. Rocourt et al. (2003) cite changes in feeding practices, such as 
the move to including bone meal in cattle feed, as one of the factors behind the emergence of 
BSE in the 1980s. As well, increasingly intensive livestock operations have been linked to a 
greater prevalence of Salmonella and Campylobacter in poultry, pigs, and cattle (Rocourt et al., 
2003). Meanwhile, changes in public perception and animal welfare requirements have led to 
more animals being raised free-range; however, this potentially exposes animals to parasites like 
Trichinella, which can only be avoided if animals are housed completely indoors (Newell et al., 
2010). Trade-offs between animal welfare and safety concerns are often difficult to resolve.  
Environmental factors: Climate change has the potential to affect disease distribution through 
vectors like different mosquito species entering new habitats, changes in water supply, and 
possible disruption of cold chains in shipping due to higher temperatures (Havelaar et al., 2010, 
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p. S85). The continued intrusion of cities and agricultural production into wildlife habitat also 
presents opportunities for new pathogens to come into contact with people (Wolfe, Daszak, 
Kilpatrick, & Burke, 2005). Moreover, the popularity of organic production has led to more 
manure being used to fertilize fields; more outbreaks have been linked to fresh produce recently. 
While the mechanism of contamination is not always clear, there is concern that contaminated 
irrigation water and unsafe handling of produce may be contributing factors (Islam, Doyle, 
Phatak, Millner, & Jiang, 2004). Meanwhile, pathogens are evolving. There are many new 
strains of anti-microbial resistant bacteria, some of which may be foodborne; a Dutch study 
found methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in 11.9% of 2217 samples of raw 
meat at the retail level (De Boer et al. 2009, as cited in Newell et al., 2010).  
Processing factors: New production methods that incorporate technological advances in 
packaging, preservatives and storage have allowed for a wider variety of foods to travel longer 
distances to consumers (Rocourt et al., 2003). Trends in consumer preferences, such as minimal 
packaging and natural preservatives, may affect contamination, as packaging may minimize 
pathogen growth (Havelaar et al., 2010). An exponential increase in global trade has led to a 
greater distance between farm and fork. The resulting global trade system has increased in 
complexity now that fewer staples are traded, and many of the food products moving around the 
globe are branded, finished products (Ercsey-Ravasz, Toroczkai, Lakner, & Baranyi, 2012). 
Ercsey-Ravasz et al. (2012) argue that such a complex trade network could allow for foodborne 
pathogens to spread worldwide very quickly, with consequences for traceability. Some food 
products appear to be sourced from new supplier countries where regulations are less stringently 
enforced or monitored; the adulteration of fresh milk with melamine in China caused significant 
angst amongst China's trading partners.   Even in well-managed supply chains, it is impossible to 
assure absolute safety: testing for potential contaminants should be specific, sensitive, cost 
effective, deliver fast results, and be incorporated effectively into the supply chain (Kennedy, 
2008), but these goals often conflict with one another.  
Systemic risk refers to when “a system fails to perform because of the ways in which its various 
components interact” (Hennessy, Roosen, & Jensen, 2003, p. 78). Given the interactions within 
the food system, there is likely to be asymmetric information within the processing chain, where 
the actions of other processors are not known. Hennessy et al. (2003) report that this may result 
25 
 
in a failure to coordinate with respect to food safety, as some operators may not treat food with 
sufficient care if they feel that others have not done so. Information asymmetry trickles down to 
the consumer, as well, as food safety is an experience good (Hobbs, 2002), and is only fully 
detectable after the food is eaten (mold is one obvious exception).  
Human factors: Other factors, related to changes in consumer preference and lifestyles, also 
have an impact on food safety. People travel more by air than ever before, which gives pathogens 
new opportunities to move from one population to another incredibly quickly (Rocourt et al., 
2003). Consumers also eat in restaurants much more frequently than they did fifty years ago; 
now, eating in restaurants is a risk factor11 for contracting foodborne disease (T. F. Jones & 
Angulo, 2006). Consumers also demand more variety, in the form of more exotic, and in some 
cases, more locally-grown foods (DeWeerdt, 2009; Newell et al., 2010). Ready-to-eat foods are 
also more widely available, which has interesting implications for foodborne disease and 
traceability. For instance, the horsemeat scandal in the EU largely involved prepared foods, and 
Listeria, a pathogen that thrives in cooler conditions, depends on refrigeration and cold chains in 
supply networks.  Lastly, older people are more susceptible to foodborne disease, which will 
become increasingly important as the population in OECD countries ages (Rocourt et al., 2003). 
The Listeria monocytogenes outbreak in Canada in 2008 linked to Maple Leaf luncheon meats 
was particularly deadly because some of the contaminated meat was served in nursing homes to 
people vulnerable to being more severely affected by foodborne diseases (Weatherill, 2009). As 
medical technologies like anti-retroviral drugs and chemotherapies improve, it is likely that more 
immune-compromised people will be living longer; they are also more prone to foodborne 
diseases (Gerba, Rose, & Haas, 1996).  
On a micro level, there is also a growing body of literature related to how people make decisions 
in situations of uncertainty. It is well documented that people do not behave in a fully rational 
way when making choices, and this also applies to safety; as noted by Green et al. (2003, p. 49), 
“Concern about food safety is theoretical, and abstract, informing decisions about food choice in 
short term and contingent ways.” Although Havelaar notes that consumers view safety as a non-
                                                 
11 Jones and Angulo (2006) note that foodborne diseases cases originating in restaurants may be more frequently 
reported.  
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negotiable characteristic that is often not considered unless it becomes a problem, there are a few 
factors that influence ebbs and flows in consumer concern over food safety. One is risk 
perception. Risk is defined12 as the probability of a hazard occurring and the severity of the 
consequences should it occur (Smyth & Phillips, 2006; Yeung & Morris, 2001). In risk 
assessment, risks that are very unlikely, but cause serious problems, are considered to be low 
risk. However, “for many situations hazardous to public and environmental health, the identities 
and relative probabilities13 of outcomes are not fully known and therefore, by definition the 
context is one of ‘uncertainty’ rather than ‘risk’” (Yeung & Morris, 2001, p. 171). As noted 
above, individual consumers may have differing conceptions of safety; safety may be viewed as 
short-term, as in food that will not cause immediate illness, or in the long-term, as in foods that 
will not cause future health problems (Green et al., 2003).  
Figure 1.3 Complex interactions in the food system 
 
                                                 
12 Smyth and Phillips (2006) note that this is the scientific definition of risk, whereas the socially constructed 
definition of risk incorporates hazard and outrage. 
13 However, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) note that even those individuals with training in statistics are prone to 
errors of judgment when dealing with intricate problems.  
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1.10 Organization and Purpose of this Study 
The remainder of this dissertation follows the three paper model: chapters two, three and four 
were written as independent journal articles, and are followed by a conclusion. As such, some 
background information was required for each of the articles, and there is some repetition.  
The ABMs used in the following three articles namely explore possible policy alternatives, rather 
than all aspects of the policy cycle, and are stylized in nature and are not intended to be used as 
predictive tools. The first two articles follow a similar structure; the ODD framework has been 
used to describe the model in detail. The last paper, in order to account for length restrictions of 
the journal it will be submitted to, has not followed the ODD structure as explicitly.14 As well, it 
should be noted that these models followed the steps of the modeling cycle during their 
development, and the final product does not show all of the iterative steps.  
The three models, although distinct pieces each discussed in their own chapter, are related. The 
first model is the most simple of the three. It represents a simplified food safety system 
representing stores, consumers, and inspectors, with very simple procedures. The model was 
intended as a proof of concept and to test my own abilities with modelling. This model was 
implemented in NetLogo: firstly, because NetLogo is an open-sourced program, and secondly, 
because the visual representation and line by line coding is fairly easy to get started with. This 
model was extended in the second paper to incorporate restaurants, more sophisticated consumer 
and inspector agents, a more complex role for information, and some new procedures. Although 
NetLogo is an easier program to begin with, it is more rigid and requires considerable coding 
ability to implement more complicated agents and environments, and it also uses discrete time 
steps. AnyLogic, a more sophisticated and flexible program, was chosen for the third model, 
since this software allows for continuous time, an easier implementation of more complex agents 
and agent memory to allow for crowdsourcing information from agents, and it can run many 
iterations much more quickly. The third model is the most complex and involves even more 
sophisticated consumer agents, the ability to divide consumer agents into groups, an inspector 
with the ability to sort information given by consumers, and much lengthier experiments 
involving more model realizations. AnyLogic also incorporates structures that allow for 
                                                 
14 However, a full ODD can be accessed in the CoMSES model library, along with the model code. 
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messages to be passed between agents, which will facilitate extending this model for future work 
incorporating agent communication.  
The first paper has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation,.  The models used in this paper were also presented as part of a poster at the ZIBI 
Summer School Scientific Symposium in Berlin, Germany in June 2013. Early drafts of this 
paper benefited from substantial comments from Drs. Peter Phillips and James Nolan. The 
second paper was presented at the Mapping the Global Dimensions of Policy 3 at McMaster in 
January 2014, and has been accepted for publication in the Journal on Policy and Complex 
Systems following comments from Drs. Phillips, Nolan and Osgood. The third paper will be 
submitted to the American Journal of Public Health and its development has been substantially 
influenced by Dr. Osgood’s other work in the Department of Computer Science. The model was 
built in AnyLogic15 which was greatly facilitated by his M.Sc student, Wenyi An. The work in 
these three articles advances the literature by contributing to the small existing base of ABMs 
focusing on food safety, while also discussing their application from a policy perspective.   
  
                                                 
15 For a detailed comparison of different software for designing ABMs, see Nikolai & Madey, 2009. 
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CHAPTER 2  
GROWING FOOD SAFETY FROM THE BOTTOM UP: AN AGENT-BASED 
MODEL OF FOOD SAFETY INSPECTIONS 
 
2.1 Abstract 
The overall burden of foodborne illness is unknown, in part because of under-reporting and 
limited surveillance. Although the morbidity associated with foodborne illness is lower than 
ever, public risk perception and an increasingly complex food supply chain contribute to 
uncertainty in the food system. This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple food safety 
system involving consumers, inspectors and stores, and investigates the effect of three different 
inspection scenarios incorporating access to information. The increasing complexity of the food 
supply chain and agent-based modeling as an appropriate method for this line of investigation 
from a policy perspective are discussed.  
2.2 Introduction 
Food exhibits multi-dimensional features; food plays a role in many contexts, including basic 
survival, cultural norms, economics, trade, and social situations. We all have a vested interest in 
food because we all have to eat. Underpinning all of these different roles is the notion that food 
should be safe.  There are many stakeholders, from consumers,16 to industry, food scientists, 
farmers, retailers, and regulatory agencies who have different criteria for determining appropriate 
food choices, leading to trade-offs and tensions in determining the best policy options for food 
safety systems. 
Over the past few decades, the global food supply chain has grown more complex, and 
breakdowns in food safety have garnered a lot of public attention. There are many notable 
examples of food safety crises that have ignited public discussion, changed consumer habits, and 
impacted legislation and industry practices:  the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) 
outbreak in the United Kingdom, which peaked in 1993 with approximately 1000 new cows 
being infected weekly (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013a); the Maple Leaf 
                                                 
16 For a more detailed discussion of food safety from a consumer perspective, see Smith DeWaal, 2003.  
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Foods Listeria monocytogenes outbreak in Canada in 2008, which resulted in 57 confirmed cases 
and 23 human deaths, partly because the deli meat in question was served to high-risk 
populations (Birk-Urovitz, 2011); and, most recently, the scandal in the European Union when 
horsemeat was found in prepared foods, such as lasagna and burgers, that were labeled as beef 
products (Waldie, 2013). These all led to demands for new and more stringent production 
methods and legislation. Food safety challenges have arisen from population growth and an 
aging population, a global market for food products and global supply chains, increased demand 
for protein, and climate change pressures on agricultural practices (Newell et al., 2010). These 
changes in food systems raise policy questions related to the optimal management of risk, which 
is also tied to food safety at an affordable cost.  
In order to investigate these concerns, a basic agent-based model (ABM) has been developed to 
explore the impact of small changes in system-level rules. Much of the literature examines 
consumer, industry, or government responses to food safety incidents in isolation; the agent-
based model considers the interaction between consumers, retailers, and inspectors. The model is 
intended to provide insight into these interactions, rather than serve as a predictive tool (Epstein, 
2008). Three model versions, representing different inspection scenarios, are described using the 
Overview, Design Concepts and Details (ODD) framework and compared. This paper provides 
background on the complexity of the food safety environment, the theory surrounding ABMs, 
employs the ODD framework for describing ABMs, the model results, and conclusions. 
2.3 Background 
The global food safety system is complex: trade, culture, microbiology and spatial and economic 
aspects all interact to form a system with interdependent elements (Miller & Page, 2007, p. 9). 
As defined by Simon (1962), a complex system is one where “a large number of parts … interact 
in a nonsimple way.” A distinction must be made here between complex and complicated 
systems; in complicated systems, the elements within the system maintain some degree of 
independence and can be studied independently. Complex systems are, by definition, not 
reducible (Miller & Page, 2007).  
A contributing factor to food safety’s complexity is a lack of certainty; the overall infection and 
disease burden from unsafe food, even in OECD countries, is unknown (Newell et al., 2010; 
Rocourt et al., 2003) and small breakdowns at any stage of the system can lead to widely 
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distributed outbreaks, given the interconnected trade system and extensive movement of people 
(Havelaar et al., 2010; Newell et al., 2010; Rocourt et al., 2003). Consumers may also assess 
safety along competing dimensions (Green et al., 2003); the safety of a food can be defined in 
the immediate term, for example, food that is not contaminated by bacteria, or in the long-term, 
as in food that will not cause health problems, such as high cholesterol, in the future.  Food 
safety can also be viewed through the competing lenses of values and science (Nestle, 2010): 
food produced in large, industrialized plants may be free from contamination and therefore 
considered safe, but consumers may express distrust of a complicated system involving 
industrialized agriculture, and its associated environmental effects, as well as the concentration 
of the food industry into the hands of a few very large, powerful companies.  As noted by 
Havelaar et al., (2010) “The consumer demands fresh, tasty, healthy and wholesome food 
products. Nevertheless, safety is in this framework considered an absolute requirement; placing 
unsafe food on the market is not an option in the consumer’s mind”. However, defining exactly 
what safe food means to consumers can be a challenging exercise. 
Food-borne disease, for the purposes of this paper, refers to all diseases caused by consuming 
food contaminated17 by any bacterial, viral, prion, or parasitic agent (Rocourt et al., 2003). 
Currently, the overall disease burden of food-borne diseases is unknown (Newell et al., 2010). 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there are 48 million cases, 
128,000 hospitalizations, and 3000 deaths related to foodborne illness annually in the United 
States; this means that 1 in 6 Americans are sick each year (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2013b). The Public Health Agency of Canada estimates that 4 million Canadians, or 
1 in 8, are sick each year (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2013). These estimates come with 
many built-in assumptions, and both organizations acknowledge that there is underreporting. 
Although foodborne disease is caused by a variety of pathogens, including common bacteria 
such as Escherichia coli, Salmonella, and Campylobacter jejuni, viruses such as Hepatitis A and 
noroviruses, and parasites such as Trichinella and Toxoplasma gondii, the most common 
symptom is diarrhoeal disease. Most cases of foodborne disease are relatively mild, and many 
people do not view diarrhoea as a serious outcome of disease but rather an inconvenience, which 
                                                 
17 Contamination by chemical hazards or environmental pollution is beyond the scope of this study. 
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contributes to underreporting of pathogens that cause milder disease (Rocourt et al., 2003). 
However, in more serious cases, foodborne diseases may result in severe complications or death, 
particularly among vulnerable segments of the population: pregnant women, young children, 
immune-compromised individuals, and older adults (Gerba et al., 1996). Given differences with 
reporting structures and surveillance, it can be difficult to compare data across countries and 
jurisdictions, since a higher number of reported cases could simply be the result of a better 
surveillance system and not necessarily from more illnesses (Rocourt et al., 2003).  
It should be clarified that the current regime of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) and risk analysis18 (Verbeke, Frewer, Scholderer, & De Brabander, 2007), developed 
over the last 30 years (Phillips, 2009), has led to declines in estimated foodborne disease 
incidence (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013b).  One definition of regulation that 
is applicable here is that it “is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing  broadly identified 
outcome” (Black 2002, p. 20, as cited in Havinga, 2006). Most of the time, the system works at 
mitigating hazards, but when it does not, there can be serious illnesses and death, and public trust 
in the food system more generally is damaged. Changes in production systems and trade present 
new opportunities for pathogens to proliferate or adapt to new hosts. Food safety policies are 
often national or regional, but as the system has become increasingly globalized, current 
management systems of risk analysis and HACCP may be overwhelmed by new pathogens and 
hazards.  
Despite new efforts in testing and safety, no pathogens have been eradicated or contained, and 
new ones are emerging (Newell et al., 2010). Increasingly, viral pathogens are a food safety 
concern, as shown by  recent hepatitis A outbreaks in the US which have been linked to frozen 
berries and pomegranate seeds imported from Turkey (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2013c), but global microbiological quality control criteria focus on bacterial counts, 
which is insufficient for dealing with viral contamination (Newell et al., 2010). The food system 
is also changing rapidly, challenging current policies.  
                                                 
18 For a discussion of principles for managing food safety, see Schlundt, 1999.  
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Rules that inform decision-making are fundamentally different in areas of uncertainty.  The 
perception of risk by people exposed to a hazard tends to also be fundamentally different from 
the technical assessment of risk. When social and psychological aspects are included, consumers 
tend to consistently overestimate some risks while underestimating others, and they are often 
keen to listen to negative information while ignoring positive information (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008; Verbeke et al., 2007; Yeung & Morris, 2001). This has led to a gap between how experts 
and the general public view food risks, leading to frustration on both sides. Heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts used to make decisions, are prevalent in consumer decision-making and lead to 
persistent biases. The availability heuristic, for example, leads people to view  events that are 
recent, dramatic, or otherwise easily recalled as more likely to occur (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Verbeke et al. (2007) highlight fright and panic elements in the social amplification of 
risk. Fright is related to the individual’s perception of the severity of the risk, and is increased if 
the risks are perceived as unavoidable or if there are differing stakeholder perspectives on 
managing the risk. Whether information is perceived as reassuring or frightening depends on 
one’s opinion (Sandman, 1994). Panic relates to the perception of risk: for example, how many 
people are exposed to the risk, whether it is unknown or uncertain, and whether it may come 
with long-term consequences has differing impact. Since food is a complex area, and a lot of 
information available may sound uncertain, incomplete, and contradictory (especially in the 
media and online), there is a lot of opportunity for public fear following foodborne illness 
outbreaks.  
The consequence is that while there is now a lower morbidity due to foodborne diseases, more 
recalls than ever are leading to poor public perception (Kramer et al., 2005). Outbreaks, due to 
the nature of our changed food system, tend to be spread out over a wide geographic area due to 
low-level contamination in processed foods (Rocourt et al., 2003, p. 8) and may require new 
approaches to dealing with their associated illnesses, in part because of anti-microbial resistance 
(Newell et al., 2010). As stated by Havelaar et al (2010, p. S80) “Due to the nature of microbes 
and our food chain, measures to ensure food safety have to be implemented on a global scale, 
necessitating a global approach.” Part of this global approach requires interdisciplinary research 
and new methods to understand and promote food safety from farm to fork in an interconnected, 
complex system. 
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2.4 Rationale for using Agent-Based Modeling 
ABM has been met with enthusiasm in some fields of the social sciences, but has not yet been 
extensively used in public policy. Although some success has been seen in modeling land use 
management, public health, and water policy, there have been fewer applications in business and 
policy analysis (Moss, 2008). This is especially true with respect to food policy.  
The strength of ABMs is that they provide a way to represent complex systems more simply, by 
focusing on the system’s individuals and their behaviours (Railsback & Grimm, 2012).  Axelrod 
(2003, p. 5) states that most modeling in the social sciences is informed by rational choice 
theory, not because many scholars feel that its assumptions accurately represent human 
behaviour, but because it allows for deduction. Adaptive behaviour offers a viable alternative to 
optimization; however, it requires simulation since the consequences of adaptation cannot be 
deduced.  ABM offers an opportunity to relax the assumptions of rational choice theory to more 
realistically model how individuals make decisions by using straightforward behavioural rules.  
 ABM’s ability to deal with heterogeneous populations that can use individual data, rather than 
aggregate data, is a unique feature with strong application to the social sciences. In many cases, 
social science problems are dealing with heterogeneous populations where variation is masked 
by aggregate data. The individual-based perspective marks an important departure from many 
theoretical positions in sociology and policy studies, which view society as a “hierarchical 
system of institutions and norms that shape individual behavior from the top down” (Macy & 
Willer, 2002, p. 144). Since people react to changes in their environment, and these reactions can 
cause further changes, this leads to difficulties in backtracking and applying different solutions to 
complex problems (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Methods that can incorporate change over time and 
control for these changes are able to more accurately capture social processes, and this is one 
area where simulation holds a lot of promise. 
Although many people consider prediction to be a primary goal of modelling, depending on the 
data available and the goals of the modeling exercise, it is not the only one. Epstein (2008) notes 
that there are many other reasons to build models, including explaining a phenomenon, guiding 
data collection, discovering new questions, illuminating uncertainties and dynamics, 
demonstrating trade-offs, challenging theory, and opening new opportunities for policy 
discussion. Importantly, since all models are simplified abstractions, Epstein (2008, para. 1.12) 
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also states that “all the best models are wrong. But they are fruitfully wrong.” Stylized models 
that are designed to offer insight to a complex system or problem so that further discussion of 
policy alternatives, legislative changes, or other adjustments may take place may still be very 
useful, even if they are incapable of prediction.  
Only a few authors have explored food safety using agent-based models.19 One example used the 
BSE outbreak in the United Kingdom as a case study to evaluate public risk perceptions using 
Cultural Theory (Bleda & Shackley, 2012). The archetypes (individualist, hierarchist, fatalist and 
egalitarian) from Cultural Theory were used to inform assumptions about agent perceptions. 
Social amplification of risk by the media and trust of government of science were also 
incorporated into the model. Verwaart and Valeeva (2011) constructed a model looking at 
producer decisions for improving animal health practices. The model incorporated economic 
incentives with social influence and was grounded in the theory of planned behaviour. Tykhonov 
et al. (2008) constructed an ABM of the trust and tracing game designed to collect data on 
decision-making behaviour in a food supply chain where there is asymmetric information about 
food safety and food quality. The model incorporated trading agents, representing producers, 
middlemen, retailers, and consumers as well as a tracing agent. The agents were separated into 
thrifty, opportunistic, or quality-minded categories, which affected their behaviour. Although it 
is possible to run experiments with human subjects to collect data on their behaviour in a trust 
and tracing game, these experiments are very time-consuming. By constructing a model, the 
authors could figure out which iterations of the game were the most interesting and then conduct 
these as experiments with human subjects. By incorporating theories of human behaviour with 
food safety scenarios, these models indicate the potential for advancing ABM in this area. 
A concern voiced in the literature involves the scientific rigor and reproducibility of ABMs. 
Many of the models published in the literature are not described using a standard format that 
allows for others to reproduce them, making independent replication of results impossible 
(Richiardi et al., 2006). In order to contribute a reproducible model, a model description 
following the Overview, Design Concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol is given below.  
                                                 
19 Another ABM looking at compliance and pig farmers is available in Dutch (van Asselt, Osinga, Asselman, & 
Sterrenburg, 2012). 
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2.5 Model Description 
The following section follows the ODD framework (Grimm et al., 2010) to clearly outline the 
objectives and implementation of a basic food safety inspection model. Using NetLogo (version 
5.0.1),20 a simulated environment was programmed where consumers, stores, and inspectors 
interact. One of the goals of the model was to observe the effect of information asymmetry on 
consumer behaviour. The system-level rules governing these interactions were changed in 
different versions of the model, allowing for comparisons between the scenarios. Insights from 
these scenarios can then be used to inform policy discussion.  
Purpose: The purpose of this model is to provide insight into the role of information and its 
influence on the optimal level of inspectors in a food system. To explore this, we compare three 
search strategies used by inspectors: a random strategy,21 one where stores can signal to 
inspectors and consumers that there is a problem,22 and lastly, an adaptation of the signalling 
stores scenario that includes false positive and false negative signals.23 
Entities, state variables and scales: The entities included in the model are stores, consumers and 
inspectors. Food products and suppliers are assumed to be embedded within the stores. The tick 
counter is used to keep track of discrete time steps. Each time the ‘go’ procedure is called, the 
tick counter increases by one tick. 
Patches: Patches have a variable called ‘store’; 100 store patches are scattered throughout the 
model. All other patches represent empty space. Stores are either contaminated or clean – these 
are represented by red and green in the model. In the scenario that includes possible errors in 
store signals, store patches also have a variable for the chance of a false positive or false negative 
signal, which ranges from .01 to .1. 
Consumers: Consumer agents are a breed of turtle in NetLogo. There are 2000 of them at the 
start of the model run.  
 
                                                 
20 NetLogo is available here: https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/  
21 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4137/version/2/view  
22 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4141/version/2/view  
23 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4139/version/2/view  
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Table 2.1 Variable description 
Variable name Description 
Range Consumers use a range of patches within which to 
search for potential destination stores 
Immune system Consumers have a probability that ranges from 10% to 
50% of becoming sick should they land on a 
contaminated patch 
Sick Consumers become sick if they land on a contaminated 
store and the random number generated is less than 
immune-system 
Bad store patches List of stores that have made this consumer sick in the 
past 
Destination Changes each time step; set to the most suitable store 
within the consumer’s range that is not a member of 
bad-store-patches 
Heal counter If a consumer becomes sick, it remains sick for 3 time 
steps and does not move 
 
Inspectors: Inspectors have a range within which they look for patches to inspect; this range is 
twice the range of consumers. The number of inspectors in the model has been varied. Firstly, 
experiments were run using 1-15 inspectors to get a sense of model outcomes. More detailed 
experiments were then run using 1 inspector, 3 inspectors, and 5 inspectors, respectively. 
Minimal spatial element: Consumers and inspectors both have a range within which they can see 
potential destinations. There are no collectives in the model. Simulations last for 150 time steps 
(or ticks, in NetLogo); the length of one time step is not specified.  
Process Overview and Scheduling: Once the model is set up, the following processes, described 
under submodels, are executed in the following order.   
 One store per time step is randomly selected and becomes contaminated.  
 Consumers execute their consume procedure, as follows: 
o Destination-set  
 Consumers evaluate all stores within their range, and choose a store patch 
that is not on their list of bad-store-patches. If no such store exists, the 
consumer wanders by randomly setting its heading and moving forward 
three patches. 
o Eat 
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 If the store is contaminated and the random-number generated is less than 
immune-system, the consumer becomes sick and adds this patch to the list 
bad-store-patches. The consumer also sets its heal counter to 1. 
o If the consumer is sick, it does not execute the above two procedures, but instead 
adds 1 to its heal-counter.  
 Inspectors test 
o The testing procedure varies depending on the complexity of the model version. 
o In this most basic model, inspectors move randomly to a store within their range. 
If the store happens to be contaminated, the inspector changes the contaminated 
variable from 1 back to 0 and changes the store’s colour to orange. If the store is 
not contaminated, the inspector does nothing. 
o In the ‘stores signal’ scenario,  5 stores per time step are selected to signal; if they 
are contaminated, they turn pink, which lets consumers know to avoid the store 
and lets inspectors know to come check it first.  
o In the ‘stores signal with errors’ scenario, 5 stores per time step are selected to 
signal. If the store is contaminated and a random floating point number is greater 
than the store’s ‘signal-error’ variable, then the store signals. If the floating point 
number is smaller, then the store will not signal even though it is contaminated (a 
false negative). As well, if the selected store is not contaminated, but the random 
floating point number is less than the store’s ‘signal-error variable, then the store 
will signal even though it is not contaminated (a false positive.) 
 Consumers that have been sick for three time steps heal. 
Since there are no collectives in the model, the order in which each consumer, inspector or patch 
executes the above is not important.  
Design Concepts: 
A number of concepts and theories underlie the model’s design, and they have been used to 
influence the variables and the submodels used in the model.   
The following basic principles, adapted from the literature on food safety, have been 
incorporated into the model. 
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Embedded supply chain: In the model, suppliers and producers are embedded and only stores are 
explicitly shown in the model. Since consumers only interact with stores and restaurants, and 
they bear the brunt of responsibility for supplying ‘safe’ food products, this element greatly 
simplified the construction of the model. The literature also supports this point: “When major 
food safety issues arise, both retailers and manufacturers will be affected (if not harmed) by any 
recall, even if they are not to blame for the problem” (Grievink, Josten and Valk, 2002, p. 481-2, 
as cited by Havinga, 2006).  
Inspection system: In the Canadian context, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency is responsible 
for enforcing policies set by Health Canada that govern the safety of food sold in Canada; the 
CFIA fulfills this mission by inspecting federally-governed abattoirs and food processing plants. 
When food safety emergencies occur, the CFIA responds along with Health Canada, provincial 
ministries, and industry to respond; food recalls are coordinated by CFIA staff. The CFIA is also 
responsible for enforcing laws on labeling and packaging, regulating products derived from 
biotechnology (although Health Canada is responsible for assessing the safety of new foods) and 
certifying exports and initial import inspections of food and agricultural products, among other 
responsibilities (Government of Canada, 2013). Provincial governments are responsible for 
provincially-licensed abattoirs, which can only sell meat in the province in which they are 
licensed. Restaurant and food service inspection is quite fragmented, and is generally carried out 
by municipalities, regional health authorities, or the provincial government, depending on the 
province (Government of Canada, 2014). Although products sold in grocery stores and 
restaurants have generally been inspected further up the supply chain, these inspections are not 
represented in the model. The model presented in this paper most closely mirrors the inspection 
of restaurants and food service outlets.    
Immune system: This is one area where there is no real answer in the literature. Although there 
have been advancements in predictive microbiology, a method used to predictively model 
pathogen spread, persistence, and death in a food source (Lammerding & Paoli, 1997; Walls & 
Scott, 1997), this research does not provide a clear translation of how pathogen loads in a food 
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source affect the actual occurrence of illness.24 Certain groups, such as the elderly, young 
children, pregnant women, and immune-compromised people are more susceptible to foodborne 
pathogens than others (Gerba et al., 1996), but there is uncertainty as to the actual likelihood of 
illness from consuming contaminated food products. As such, model runs were completed using 
an immune system parameter that is heterogeneous and varies throughout the population between 
.1 and .5.  
Consumer avoidance: Previous research conducted by the Food Standards Association in the UK 
indicates that, if they had concerns about hygiene, up to 70% of respondents would not purchase 
again from a food service outlet (as cited by Choi, Nelson, & Almanza, 2011). As well, focus 
group research from the UK has indicated that personal experience with food poisoning is an 
important source of knowledge for changing food safety behaviour, and some quoted participants 
indicated that getting sick after eating specific products from a supermarket meant that they 
would never return (Green et al., 2003, p. 44). Since the literature did not provide adequate 
explanation of what factors would influence a consumer to return to a food service outlet where 
they believed they had contracted an illness, this concept was simplified for use in the model:  
consumer agents will not return to stores where they have become sick in the past.  
Store signals: It is possible for a store to close temporarily and trigger an investigation from 
inspectors if it realizes that there is a problem with its food. For example, during the 2012 XL 
Foods E. coli outbreak, a Regina restaurant called Flip decided to close its doors when five 
people reported cases of E. coli, and the only common feature with all five cases was that they 
had recently eaten at Flip (CBC News, 2012a). Although the restaurant had recently been 
inspected and had passed, the owner voluntarily closed the restaurant to keep any other 
customers from becoming sick while the source of the contamination was determined. This 
element has been incorporated as a signalling mechanism, where stores change their colour to 
                                                 
24 One such example that was decided by the courts took place in the United States, where FSIS tried to shut down a 
processing plant that had exceeded Salmonella counts. The plant refused on the basis that the product had come 
contaminated from the slaughterhouse, and the plant never failed any sanitation tests. A federal judge ruled that 
FSIS could not withdraw inspection based on Salmonella counts alones: “The appeals court ruling supports 
arguments of those who say that pathogen testing results should not be a basis for enforcement actions until 
scientists can determine what constitutes a unsafe level of Salmonella in ground meat” (Rawson & Becker, 2004). 
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communicate with inspectors that they should be inspected first and so consumers can avoid that 
location until the contamination has been rectified.  
Store signals with errors:  On occasion, stores with a suspected problem may choose to ignore it 
and not close; there is also the possibility that a store will close unnecessarily. The restaurant 
Flip, as mentioned above, closed temporarily to undergo thorough testing, which found no E. coli 
present on surfaces or food samples (CBC News, 2012b). This has been represented in the model 
by stores signalling with a small chance of either a false positive or false negative signal. This 
allows for less than perfect information in signalling, which reduces the efficiency of 
inspections. 
Asymmetric information:  This principle is informed by Akerlof’s (1970) work on asymmetric 
information in markets. Consumers and inspectors are unable to tell if a store is contaminated 
prior to landing on it. An interesting application of this theory in future models would be to 
incorporate signals of quality, such as branding, inspection certificates, or other quality assurance 
methods. 
No consumption while sick: Given the typical symptoms of diarrhea and vomiting that 
accompany foodborne illness, the assumption that one would stay home and avoid going out to 
stores or restaurants seems reasonable. This was also implemented for practical modeling 
reasons, as it prevents a consumer from landing on a contaminated store and becoming sick 
while already infected from a previous visit. 
Emergence:  The important results from the model are the overall numbers of sick agents, 
contaminated stores, inspected stores, and “naïve” agents at the end of the model. Since the 
changes between model versions are imposed by changes in the rules that agents follow, the 
results are built in and not the result of emergent behaviour.    
Adaptation/learning: Consumers adapt their behaviour by updating the list bad-store-patches. If 
they have gotten sick from eating at a contaminated store, they add this store to the list and avoid 
this patch in the future (even if the store has since been inspected and it is no longer 
contaminated). Consumers also avoid signalling stores.  
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Objectives: Consumers want to avoid getting sick, and this fits into their adaptive behaviour of 
avoiding stores that have made them sick in the past. Store patches want to avoid contamination, 
and if that is not possible, avoid making consumers sick by signalling – although this is imposed. 
An implicit assumption is that inspectors should inspect efficiently; again, the different 
inspection strategies are imposed, rather than allowing the agents to choose which they prefer.  
Sensing: Inspectors and consumers have the same sensing capabilities: both types of agent can 
sense when a patch is signalling, and they can tell whether a store is contaminated once they land 
on it. However, landing on a contaminated store may make consumers sick, but inspectors can 
reverse the contaminated variable so that the store is safe again. Consumers cannot sense 
whether a patch has recently been inspected or whether consumers near them are sick.  
Interaction: At this stage, neither consumers nor inspectors interact with one another directly. 
Consumers interact with stores by visiting them (although other consumers may be present there 
at the same time) and consuming, and inspectors interact with stores.  
Stochasticity is used in generating a random number to determine whether or not the consumer 
will get sick. Also, if consumers complete the ‘wander’ procedure, they determine a heading 
randomly and move three patches in that direction. Prediction is not used. There are no 
collectives, or “aggregations of agents that affect the state or behavior of member agents and are 
affected by their members” (Railsback & Grimm, 2012, p. 41), in the model. 
Observation: The following attributes are tracked using BehaviorSpace at each time step. This 
output was then analyzed in R (version 2.15.1)   
 The number of agents that are sick (indicated by brown agents in the model) 
 The number of signalling (pink) stores at any one time 
 The number of contaminated (orange) stores that inspectors inspect 
 The number of stores that stay contaminated (red) 
 The number of “naïve” consumers (those that have never gotten sick over the course of 
the model run, indicated by yellow agents)  
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Initialization: Model runs were executed with 2000 consumers, 100 stores, and 1, 3 or 5 
inspectors. The world was set to 33x33, for 1089 total patches, with a centre origin point. The 
world wraps both horizontally and vertically. Each simulation was run for 150 time steps. 
To determine the appropriate number of consumers and stores, simulations were run at various 
levels of stores and consumers. The actual density of food service outlets is about 1 for every 350 
Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2006). However, approximating this density in NetLogo would 
have a prohibitive time cost; running very large simulations in BehaviorSpace is extremely slow. 
To balance the effects of scaling up with the time cost of running multiple scenarios, 2000 
consumers and 100 stores were included in the model.  
Consumers: All consumers have immune-system set to between .1 and .5, sick set to 0, heal-
counter set to 0, and range set to 5. The lists destination and bad-store-patches are empty. 
Consumers are scattered randomly throughout the world.  
Patches: Of the 1089 patches in the environment, 100 are selected, and store is set to 1. All 
store-patches have the contaminated variable set to 0 at initialization. 
Inspectors: All inspectors have a range of 10. They are scattered randomly throughout the world.  
Most of these initial values were estimated, as there is little empirical data available. No data was 
incorporated from other models or external data files.  
Submodels:  
Consumers: “Healthy” consumers are asked to complete the consume procedure; consumers that 
are sick must remain on their last destination for 3 time steps. The consume procedure contains 
two sub-procedures: destination-set and eat. To destination-set, consumers identify which 
patches within their range are stores that are not on the list bad-store-patches (and are not 
signalling that they are contaminated, depending on the model version). They then choose one of 
these destinations from the patch-set and move there. If no patches within their range meet the 
criteria, the consumer wanders by setting their heading randomly and moving forward three 
patches. In the eat procedure, the consumer identifies whether or not the patch they have landed 
on is contaminated. If it is contaminated and the random number generated is less than the 
consumer’s ‘immune-system,’ the consumer’s sick variable changes to 1 from 0 and the 
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consumer changes its colour to brown,  then adds this patch to the its list bad-store-patches. All 
consumers execute this code in a random order. More than one consumer can land on a store at 
the same time. 
Inspectors: Inspectors are asked to complete the test procedure. Depending on the model version, 
the inspector is instructed to test any signaling (pink) stores within its range first, since these 
ones are signaling that they may be contaminated. Otherwise, the inspector chooses a store 
within its range at random and checks it. When the inspector lands on a store that is 
contaminated, it changes the store’s contaminated variable back to zero and changes the patch 
colour from red (or pink, if it was signaling) to orange. If the patch is not contaminated, the 
inspector does nothing.  
Patches: Only patches that are stores and belong to the agent-set ‘store-patches’ will be 
discussed here. All other patches simply represent empty space. Store patches all start out green 
to indicate that they are not contaminated, and one store per turn is instructed to change its 
contaminated variable to 1 from 0 and its colour to red. Agents cannot sense this information 
prior to landing on the store, unless the store is pink to signal contamination. In versions that 
incorporate signaling, five patches per time step are instructed to check themselves for 
contamination. If a selected patch is contaminated, it signals this to consumers and inspectors by 
changing its colour to pink. In the scenario that allows for signals with errors, the signal 
procedure incorporates a random floating point number. If the store is contaminated and the 
random number is less than its ‘signal-error’ variable, the store will not signal even though it 
should, and if the patch is not contaminated but the random number is less than its ‘signal-error’ 
variable, the store will signal, even though it is clean.  
Table 2.2 Scenario summary 
 Baseline Signal Signal with errors 
Consumers Avoid “bad 
stores” 
Avoid “bad stores” & 
signalling stores 
Avoid “bad stores”& signalling 
stores 
Inspectors Test randomly Test signalling stores first; if 
none in range, test randomly 
Test signalling stores first; if 
none in range, test randomly 
Patches Random 
contamination 
Random contamination, up 
to 5 stores signal per time 
step 
Random contamination, up to 5 
stores signal per time step (but 
signals are uncertain) 
 
45 
 
2.6 Analysis of Model Results  
Initially, all model scenarios were run with the number of inspectors ranging from 1-15. The 
marginal returns of adding additional inspectors are minimal once there are five inspectors in the 
model; therefore, more detailed runs were conducted using 100 repetitions each of one, three, 
and five inspectors. Each model run lasted for 150 time steps and all data was collected at the 
end of the model run. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to check the statistical 
significance of having one, three, and five inspectors for each scenario, and was followed by 
post-hoc analysis using pair-wise t-tests, using the Bonferroni correction to account for multiple 
comparisons. Unless otherwise stated, the pairwise analysis results are statistically significant (p 
<.001). 
The first scenario is the most simple (see Table 2.3); inspectors move randomly from store to 
store and consumers receive no information besides whether or not they become ill.  The number 
of sick consumers declines substantially as the number of inspectors goes up, but with decreasing 
marginal returns. As well, the number of contaminated stores decreases as inspectors are added, 
and the number of inspected stores increases, again with decreasing marginal returns. The 
decrease in contaminated stores is likely fueling the declines in the number of sick consumers. 
Lastly, the number of naïve consumers increases as there are more inspectors in the model, but 
even with five inspectors, only a very small percentage (1.2%, on average) of the total population 
never experiences an illness over the course of the model run.   
Table 2.3 Random inspection scenario 
  1 inspector 3 inspectors 5 inspectors ANOVA 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F(1,298) p-value 
Sick Consumers 499.22 38.41 310.21 38.02 227.48 35.36 1807 p<.001 
Contaminated 
Stores 49.02 3.86 26.24 3.06 17.03 2.69 2463 p<.001 
Inspected Stores 29.47 3.36 51.97 3.84 60.62 4.09 1947 p<.001 
Naïve Consumers 0.91 1.627 8.35 3.83 25.66 10.58 633.2 p<.001 
 
The next step in advancing the model was to allow five randomly selected stores per tick to 
signal. This signaling mechanism would be similar to a store realizing that there was a problem 
and voluntarily closing its doors and inviting in inspectors to help rectify the issue. In this 
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scenario, signaling information is perfect; that is, a signal indicates that the store is definitely 
contaminated. The results of this scenario are shown in Table 2.4.  
Since inspectors move first to signaling stores within their range and consumers avoid these 
stores, even though very few stores were self-testing at any given time, the number of sick 
consumers was considerably reduced compared to the random inspection model.  The effect of 
signaling information is profound: outcomes are better with only one inspector when there is 
signaling (209.8 sick consumers, on average), compared to having five inspectors conducting 
random inspections (227.48 sick consumers, on average). Inspectors are also able to control the 
number of contaminated stores more effectively, particularly when there are few inspectors. 
Increasing the number of inspectors from 3 to 5 shows that the effectiveness of the signal 
mechanism is subject to considerable decreasing marginal returns, likely because the inspectors’ 
ranges begin to overlap and a signaling store could end up with more than one inspector there at 
the same time. In the case of signaling stores, there was no significant effect in post-hoc testing 
(p > .05) of increasing the number of inspectors from three to five, even though the overall 
ANOVA results were still significant. The number of naïve consumers also increases compared 
to the random inspection scenario, but even with five inspectors in the model only about 6% of 
the total population, on average, avoids becoming ill over the course of the model run. 
Table 2.4 Stores signal with certainty 
  1 inspector 3 inspectors 5 inspectors ANOVA 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F(1,298) p-value 
Sick Consumers 209.8 39.24 161.32 30.67 136.63 30.04 231.6 p<.001 
Contaminated 
Stores 20.57 2.55 11.92 2.22 9.21 2.15 883.4 p<.001 
Inspected Stores 57.61 3.62 66.16 3.75 68.6 3.97 368.8 p<.001 
Naïve Consumers 34.69 11.22 74.39 18.12 120.52 25.61 992.5 p<.001 
Signaling Stores 5.09 2.12 0.44 0.61 0.17 0.4 439.5 p<.001 
 
Finally, a scenario was constructed to investigate the impact of imperfect information in store 
signals. This variation on the stores signal scenario included errors:  when stores are selected to 
signal whether or not they were contaminated, there is a chance between 1% and 10% that a 
‘clean’ store may signal, or that a contaminated store may not. In this variation, there were 
slightly more sick consumers, on average, compared to the version with perfect signaling 
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information, as well as slightly higher levels of contaminated stores and lower levels of inspected 
stores.  However, the difference between the two scenarios shrinks as more inspectors are added. 
Once again, in the case of signaling stores, there was no significant effect of going from three to 
five inspectors in post-hoc testing (p >0.05), even though the overall ANOVA results were still 
significant. Table 2.5 shows the results for the scenario with stores signaling with errors.  
Table 2.5 Stores signal with errors 
  1 inspector 3 inspectors 5 inspectors ANOVA 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD F(1,298) p-value 
Sick Consumers 223.55 37.37 168.63 26.64 139.81 31.72 327 p<.001 
Contaminated 
Stores 23.58 2.45 13.06 2.11 9.72 2.12 1224 p<.001 
Inspected Stores 48.26 4.11 55.55 4.33 58.7 4.31 287.4 p<.001 
Naïve Consumers 26.22 8.39 63.04 17.52 103.72 25.21 890.3 p<.001 
Signaling Stores 9.1 3.04 0.87 0.97 0.29 0.57 574.1 p<.001 
  
To check for a significant effect of scenario type while controlling for the number of inspectors 
present, analysis of variance was conducted. Post-hoc analysis using pair-wise t-tests was also 
completed. Unless otherwise stated, the pairwise analysis results are statistically significant (p 
<.001). The ANOVA results are reported in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6 All three scenarios 
  1 inspector 3 inspectors 5 inspectors 
  ANOVA ANOVA ANOVA 
  F(2,297) p-value F(2,297) p-value F(2,297) p-value 
Sick Consumers 1812 p<.001 666 p<.001 252.5 p<.001 
Contaminated Stores 2678 p<.001 1013 p<.001 350.1 p<.001 
Inspected Stores 1494 p<.001 343.6 p<.001 161.8 p<.001 
Naïve Consumers 465.5 p<.001 575.5 p<.001 547.8 p<.001 
 
The post-hoc analysis showed that as inspectors are added, the difference between the scenarios 
shrinks; this is especially true for the stores signal with certainty and stores signal with errors 
scenarios. When there is one inspector, the difference in the number of sick consumers between 
stores signaling with certainty and stores signaling with errors is significant (p < .05), but with 
three inspectors, the results are not statistically significant (p > .05) and with five inspectors, they 
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are identical (p = 1). As well, with three inspectors, the difference in the number of contaminated 
stores is significant between the stores signal with certainty and stores signal with errors 
scenarios (p < .01), but once there are five inspectors, the results are no longer significant (p 
>.05).  
Figure 2.1 shows the differences in the number of sick consumers for all three scenarios.  The 
considerable difference in the number of sick consumers in the signaling scenarios compared to 
the random inspection scenario is clearly shown, as is the diminishing marginal returns of adding 
additional inspectors.  
Figure 2.1 Sick consumers, all scenarios 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the number of contaminated stores for all three scenarios. Giving inspectors 
more information through signaling, even if that information is flawed, considerably reduces the 
number of contaminated stores. 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Contaminated stores, all scenarios 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the number of inspected stores for all three scenarios.  Since in the signal with 
errors scenario, some stores are signaling without actually being contaminated, fewer stores are 
successfully inspected. 
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Figure 2.3 Inspected stores, all scenarios 
 
Finally, Figure 2.4 shows the number of naïve consumers for all scenarios. Since consumers 
avoid stores that are signaling under the assumption that they are contaminated, fewer consumers 
become sick over the course of the model run in the stores signal with certainty scenario. 
However, when stores signal with errors, some stores that are contaminated should signal but do 
not, which results in slightly more consumers becoming ill at some point during the model run. 
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Figure 2.4 Naive consumers, all scenarios 
 
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions 
The above research shows that food safety is a complex problem, and that ABMs are an 
insightful way of studying complex problems. A simple model of a food safety system was 
presented using the ODD framework. The model results have a few applications to policy. 
Firstly, as stated by Bonabeau (2002) and Moss (2008), ABMs were noted as having great 
potential for policy but had been applied in only a few situations. This approach advances the 
literature by providing a model that incorporates inspectors, consumers, and stores into a food 
safety simulation. Only a handful of other models have been found in this area (Bleda & 
Shackley, 2012; Tykhonov et al., 2008; Verwaart & Valeeva, 2011). The model results also 
show the effect of giving inspectors and consumers more information: even if the information 
provided by stores signaling is uncertain, the outcome of having one inspector with access to 
imperfect signaling information (223.55 sick consumers, on average) is similar to five inspectors 
using random inspections (227.48 sick consumers, on average). In the current climate of 
government austerity, employing new means of improving consumer and inspector access to 
food safety information could improve outcomes without taxing already thin resources.  
There are a number of avenues for future work using this model. Namely, the model should be 
adapted to better take advantage of the strengths of ABM by incorporating more heterogeneity 
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and complexity into individual agents. As well, inspection rules that are closer to the real world 
system, such as a tiered system of oversight which is used by the Regional Health Authorities in 
Saskatchewan and has been proposed by the CFIA (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2012), 
will be incorporated in future work, as will the influence of retailer compliance on outcomes. 
Some jurisdictions have also made inspection results public, giving consumers more information 
with which to make decisions on where to eat (Filion & Powell, 2009; P. A. Simon et al., 2005); 
the effect of this information on decision making will be used to inform future models. Green et 
al.’s (2003) work on the social meanings of food choice, the influence of social norms on 
decision making, and the role of information in social networks could be incorporated by 
including communication between neighbouring agents to share information on experiences with 
the safety of certain food outlets. Different types of information could be incorporated, which 
could provide additional insights on the effect of information on choice and adaptive agent 
behaviour.  
In his work discussing New Public Management, Hood (1991) discusses three sets of core values 
in public management: sigma (efficiency), theta (fairness), and lamda (robustness). He 
characterizes sigma values as most closely related to New Public Management, where frugality is 
the standard of success and waste is the standard of failure. For theta values, the achievement of 
fairness is the standard of success and unfairness or bias is the standard of failure. Lastly, for 
lamda values, resilience is the standard of success and catastrophe, risk or breakdown is the 
standard of failure. These value sets apply to food production systems as well as to public 
management. In many supply chains, the tendency of business interests is to lean towards sigma 
values, where efficiency is king. However, as supply chains increase in complexity and change 
ever more rapidly as more actors are involved in the production and distribution of food, a 
movement towards greater resilience may be warranted,25 even as this results in redundancies. 
As noted by Miller and Page (2007), a certain level of redundancy in complex systems may 
make them more readily adaptable. The balance of valuing efficiency or resilience is another 
trade off within the food policy space, as Hensen and Caswell (1999, p. 591) note:  
                                                 
25 This sentiment is echoed by Henessey (2003), who comments that narrow technology development platforms that 
may not be able to adapt to changes may introduce systemic risk into food production. 
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Rather, it is evident that policy is the outcome of a complex trade-off between alternative 
demands that reflect the interests of the different groups that might be affected. In the 
case of food policy this will include consumer, food manufacturers, food retailers and 
farmers, both at home and abroad, as well as government itself and taxpayers. One of the 
key challenges facing policymakers is to balance these alternative demands because, in 
many cases, these different groups apply alternative criteria, both when judging the need 
for food safety regulation, ex ante, and the success/failure of food safety regulation, ex 
post. Furthermore, these criteria are generally not explicitly stated, with the result that the 
policy debate lacks coherence and, in some cases, transparency. 
 Complex problems, if they are to be effectively handled by regulatory structures, require 
transparency and information shared between all stakeholders. Agent-based models that 
incorporate transparency, accountability and information exchange may be a useful source of 
insight for accomplishing these objectives. 
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CHAPTER 3   
WHAT’S ON THE MENU: ASSESSING MANUFACTURED RISK IN 
RESTAURANT INSPECTION SYSTEMS USING AGENT-BASED MODELS 
3.1 Abstract 
To explore elements of foodborne disease as ‘manufactured risk’, an agent-based model (ABM) 
has been developed using NetLogo. The model shows a stylised version of the current policy 
environment for inspecting restaurants, and illustrates opportunities for improving the 
transparency of current inspection systems by disclosing inspection scores. The model also 
examines the effect of increasing restaurant compliance. The results show that giving consumers 
access to restaurant inspection scores results in a slightly higher mean number of sick consumers, 
but much less variation overall in the number of sick consumers. In both scenarios, more 
compliant restaurants results in fewer sick consumers. 
3.2 Introduction 
In his seminal work on the risk society, Beck (1992, p. 19) posited that “the social production of 
wealth is systematically accompanied by the social production of risks.” The way these risks are 
produced, distributed and defined by technical and scientific systems is a key source of conflict 
in modern society. A particularly interesting group of ‘manufactured risks’ is associated with 
foodborne disease. Given the modern, globally connected supply chain, and embedded threats to 
food safety combined with an aging population that is more likely to suffer from foodborne 
illnesses, it is clear that foodborne disease will become an increasingly important issue for 
Canadians. Eating outside the home has also been highlighted as a risk factor for foodborne 
disease (T. F. Jones & Angulo, 2006), and that Canadians continue to spend more on restaurant 
meals (GE Capital Franchise Finance, 2013; Statistics Canada, 2006), potentially increasing their 
chances of coming into contact with foodborne illness.  
To explore elements of foodborne disease as manufactured risk, we developed an agent-based 
simulation model (ABM). The model is designed to represent a stylized version of the current 
policy environment for inspecting restaurants, illustrating opportunities for improving the 
transparency of current food inspection systems by disclosing inspection results. Although this 
policy issue has been explored using other methods including surveys (Henson et al., 2006) and 
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statistical modeling (P. A. Simon et al., 2005), the application of ABM is a new method for 
investigating this space. Results from the simulation analysis show that giving consumers more 
information about restaurant inspection scores results in a slightly higher average number of sick 
consumers, but much less variability. Overall, as the number of restaurants that comply with 
regulations increases, the number of sick consumers decreases.  
3.2 The Risk Society 
Risks in the modern world are different. Whereas most hazards in the pre-industrial era were 
based on natural causes, we now deal with new risks that stem from our attempts to control the 
natural world – they are caused by the industrial advancement of society. These manufactured 
risks,26 as defined by Beck (1992, p. 21), are “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.”27 Manufactured risks, such as the 
risks associated with nuclear power or widespread pollution from agricultural fertilizers, 
transcend the boundaries of individual households, regulatory jurisdictions, and nation-states. 
They are generally imperceptible and thus require expert assessment using the tools of modern 
science, and they are prone to social constructions and definitions, while also having an 
equalizing effect because they often affect people across classes and countries (Beck, 1992, p. 
23). The consequences of manufactured risks are political in nature. A key element of the risk 
society is that societal intervention involving decision-making and governance processes are 
what “transforms incalculable hazards into calculable risks” (Elliott, 2002, p. 295). This societal 
intervention changes the nature of society itself, and thus further changes the nature of risk 
through process known as reflexive modernization (Beck, 1992, p. 153).  
Although concerns related to food safety are ancient (Keusch, 2013), the role of science, 
technology and scale in food production has arguably led to more uncertainty now in food 
systems than previously. Many of the key features of manufactured risks are applicable to 
foodborne disease. In fact, the concept of food risks as manufactured risks has been explored 
elsewhere (Green et al., 2003), but will be expanded here. The first aspect of manufactured risks 
                                                 
26 Manufactured risks should be distinguished from manufactured uncertainty, which is when there is scientific 
consensus on the issue, but outside stakeholders (who may have questionable motives) “try to inject uncertainty into 
the equation” (Lofstedt, 2006, p. 882).  
27 As well, it should be noted that Beck, a philosopher, uses a very specific definition of risk. Risk definitions (such 
as hazard x exposure), as used in the bureaucratic Risk Analysis Framework, are more quantitative. 
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is their invisibility. Risks are hidden in everyday life, and are only brought to our attention 
through the application of the tools of science, such as risk assessments and microbiological 
analysis (Beck, 1992, p. 21). What is more confusing for consumers is that food that has been 
contaminated by bacteria generally looks, tastes and smells completely normal (Alberta Health, 
2014). The invisibility of modern food risk means that consumers need assurance about the 
safety of food by experts or inspection agencies. Since these modern risks are invisible, they are 
socially constructed and defined, and these definitions shift over time as the media and other 
factors influence public attention and risk perception. Indeed, because risks are invisible and 
require ‘scientization’ in order to be perceptible to individuals, it is often unclear whether 
exposure to the risk has increased, or whether public perception of it has become heightened 
(Beck, 1992, p. 55).  
A second aspect of manufactured risks is that they emerge from the production of wealth in 
modern, post-industrial societies (Beck, 1992). Like wealth, risks are distributed throughout 
society, but risk distributions are not directly tied to wealth distributions. Some risks affect the 
poor disproportionately, as some argue wealthy people may be able to “purchase safety and 
freedom from risk” (Beck, 1992, p. 35) in the form of higher quality of food that they perceive to 
be safer, for example, produce grown without the use of pesticides. Certainly, it could be argued 
that risk, globally, is dropping, thanks to many of the advantages of modernization such as 
vaccines and improved sanitation, but that it is not dropping equally for everyone. In terms of 
risks related to food, in many cases the ultimate consequence of foodborne disease is borne by 
the individual consumer who becomes ill. In these cases, knowledge about sources of food risk 
serves to shift risk distributions, as well as risk perceptions.  
Some foodborne illnesses result from inappropriate handling or other problems at the final 
preparation stage. Recent work by Batz, Hoffman and Morris (2011, p. 13) indicates that 70 to 
80% of outbreaks28 from multi-ingredient dishes resulted from foods prepared outside the home. 
This means that such risks can be equalizing in a distributional sense – even those with money or 
power may not be able to avoid them. Foodborne disease risk is present everywhere. In 2013, 
                                                 
28 The CDC (2014b) defines a foodborne disease outbreak as “an incident in which two or more persons experience 
a similar illness after ingestion of a common food, and epidemiologic analysis implicates the food as the source of 
the illness.” 
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Noma, a Copenhagen restaurant that is considered to be among the world’s finest, was the source 
of a norovirus outbreak that sickened 63 diners (Abend, 2013). Food risks also have a 
“boomerang effect”(Beck, 1992, p. 37) where even those who are producing the risks are 
afflicted by them. This is especially the case with food since we all need to eat.   
Lastly, modern risks are often politically explosive. There are extensive social, economic and 
political side effects of health risks, a situation made apparent in the fallout following the 
discovery of the link between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
Disease (vCJD) in the United Kingdom (Palmer, 1996). Following such an outbreak, people tend 
to employ risk avoiding behaviours (Yeung & Morris, 2001) and reduce their consumption of 
implicated foods, but then slowly return to previous consumption levels (Bocker & Hanf, 2000; 
Knight, Worosz, & Todd, 2009). This element of consumer behaviour is consistent with the risk 
society: “Where everything turns into a hazard, somehow nothing is dangerous anymore … The 
risk society shifts from hysteria to indifference and vice versa” (Beck, 1992, pp. 36–37).  
3.3 Emerging Issues Related to Foodborne Disease 
Food supply chains now are more interconnected and complex than ever. Global food trade has 
increased from approximately 50 billion USD in 1960, to 438 billion USD in 1998, to 1060 
billion in 2008 (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2012). Such a rapid increase has obvious implications for 
foodborne disease outbreaks, especially since trade has moved away from staples and into 
finished, ready to eat products, which pose challenges for traceability. Ultimately, the modern 
dense, complex global supply chain could allow for foodborne pathogens to spread very quickly 
and thus make it extremely difficult to isolate the source of an outbreak (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 
2012; Keusch, 2013; McEntire, 2013). Risks that are global in nature and extend beyond national 
boundaries are key elements of the risk society (Beck, 1992). Since many foods are now 
imported, “food safety in Canada is not simply an outcome of a nationally bound system, but 
depends also on how well Canada’s food safety system interacts with global institutions and 
systems” (Munro, Le Vallee, & Stuckey, 2012, p. 3).  
However, there is uncertainty about the number of foodborne disease cases per year in North 
America. The overall disease burden of food-borne diseases is unknown (Newell et al., 2010). 
The Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) estimates that 4 million Canadians, or 1 in 8, are 
sick each year from foodborne illnesses (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2013). The Centers 
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for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there are 48 million cases, 128,000 
hospitalizations, and 3000 deaths related to foodborne illness annually in the United States. This 
means that 1 in 6 Americans are sick each year (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2013b). These estimates are built upon numerous assumptions; and both the CDC and PHAC 
acknowledge that there is underreporting, in part because many cases are relatively mild and thus 
not officially diagnosed.  
Given differences between national reporting structures and surveillance, it can be difficult to 
compare data across countries and jurisdictions. A higher number of reported cases could simply 
be the result of  better surveillance and  improved reporting, and not necessarily because of more 
illnesses (Rocourt et al., 2003). Additional data from the Conference Board of Canada suggests 
that there are 6.8 million cases of foodborne disease in Canada each year (Munro et al., 2012 
Appendix A) while survey data29 indicates that approximately 8.5% of Canadians missed work in 
the last year because of foodborne illness (Munro et al., 2012, p. 9). However, the uncertainty 
associated with these estimates makes evaluating the effectiveness of current monitoring systems 
difficult. Although the goals of risk governance in the food system are to reduce the number 
illnesses caused by foodborne diseases, determining whether this has occurred is tricky when 
there are gaps in our understanding of the true burden of foodborne diseases.  
Further uncertainties in demographic shifts illustrate the interconnectedness of foodborne 
diseases and demographics. In Canada, as in other OECD countries, population is aging at a 
rapid rate. Between 2006-2011, the number of seniors over 65 in Canada increased by 14.1% and 
now comprise around 5 million people, while the 60-64 age group grew by 29.1% over the same 
time period (Statistics Canada, 2013). The Canadian Food Inspection Agency identifies adults 
over 60 as an at-risk population for foodborne disease (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 
2013). Additionally, pregnant women, young children, and immunocompromised people are 
more prone to foodborne illness (Gerba et al., 1996). As the Canadian population ages, the 
incidence of diseases that accompany age such as cancer and diabetes are likely to increase. 
Individuals who suffer from these illnesses are necessarily more prone to foodborne illness. 
Additionally, advancements in medical technology such as chemotherapy and anti-retroviral 
                                                 
29 The Conference Board of Canada obtained this data based on respondents self-reporting foodborne illness.  
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drugs will lead to a greater number of immunocompromised individuals living longer, with 
associated implications for foodborne illness incidence and severity. These interconnected 
elements of the food system further contribute to the uncertainty of managing risks related to 
foodborne diseases.  
Consumer Perceptions of Foodborne Illness Risk 
Particularly in the absence of a recent food illness catastrophe, focus group research shows that 
safety is just one of many attributes influencing food purchasing decisions. People report 
generally feeling quite competent at making food decisions (Green et al., 2003). But is this 
feeling correct? Although pronounced uncertainty remains as to the overall incidence and 
sources of foodborne illness (Jacob & Powell, 2009), estimates indicate that up to 70% of 
foodborne illnesses can be linked to foodservice establishments (as cited by Filion & Powell, 
2009, p. 287). In turn, Canadians are spending an increasing amount of money on restaurant 
meals (GE Capital Franchise Finance, 2013; Statistics Canada, 2006). Due to these issues, the 
remainder of this paper will focus specifically on foodborne illness risks associated with eating 
food prepared by others in a restaurant environment.  
Although restaurant inspection systems seek to lower the incidence of foodborne disease, 
evidence is mixed on how well inspection scores predict future illness outbreaks (P. A. Simon et 
al., 2005). In fact, the uncertainty in data on restaurant-related outbreaks makes it difficult to 
structure an effective study in this area  (Filion & Powell, 2009, pp. 293–294). There are also 
inconsistencies between jurisdictions as to what constitutes a critical violation as well as the 
frequency of inspections (Filion & Powell, 2009). The complexity of the food chain implies that 
a systems-level perspective on restaurant food safety from ‘farm-to-fork’ is required to fully 
understand what is happening. But often the final responsibility for such decisions is simply 
shifted to the consumer, leaving it up to her to make sound choices with the (often incomplete) 
food safety information available. In this regard, some scholars have advocated for a greater 
level of transparency to encourage trust in food systems affected by contemporary risks, such as 
genetically modified food products (Clark, 2013; Goncalves, 2004). This raises the question – 
will improving transparency in the restaurant inspection system help consumers stay safe?   
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Some jurisdictions employ methods for giving consumers better access to inspection scores. For 
example, other jurisdictions, including the province of Saskatchewan, make recent restaurant 
inspection results available online.30In other areas, consumers must formally request a copy of 
inspection results (Filion & Powell, 2009), a situation presenting a strong ‘default’ barrier for 
accessing appropriate information (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Although the former is an 
improvement with respect to information transparency, the process still requires a consumer to 
choose a restaurant ahead of time and look it up in advance. Other areas have chosen to make 
information available to the consumer at the actual decision point. For example, Toronto requires 
all restaurants to post their most recent inspection notice at or near the main entrance (City of 
Toronto, 2012),31 while the city of Los Angeles requires that inspection scores, in the form of 
letter grades, be posted near the entry of a restaurant, as well as in an online database (P. A. 
Simon et al., 2005).  
Previous related research in this area has focused on the economic concept of asymmetric 
information (Akerlof, 1970): by disclosing inspection results, consumers can incorporate this 
information in their decision-making, and restaurants have an economic incentive to comply with 
food safety statutes, lest they lose customers (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Jin & Leslie, 2003; P. A. 
Simon et al., 2005; Weil, Fung, Graham, & Fagotto, 2006). By giving consumers access to 
inspection information, transparency in the system would be improved, which could improve 
consumer trust; however, the interaction between increased trust and its effect on swings in 
consumer behaviour between hysteria and indifference requires further attention.     
3.4 Methodology 
This paper explores the questions of transparency in food inspection systems using an agent-
based simulation model. This type of modeling provides a way to represent a complex system 
more simply by focusing on the system’s individuals and their behaviours (Railsback & Grimm, 
2012).  Agent-based modeling represents a significant departure from other methods that focus 
on reducing a system to its component parts, or on aggregating data and looking at averages. 
New methods are required to assist with unpacking system-level behaviours that may help us 
                                                 
30 Saskatchewan Online Restaurant Inspection Information: http://orii.health.gov.sk.ca/rhaReport.aspx?RHA=6 
31 See Filion & Powell, 2009 for a more in-depth discussion of other jurisdictions and their disclosure systems. 
61 
 
cope with the interconnected nature of the risk society. As described by Bonabeau (2002, p. 
7280), “ABM is a mindset more than a technology. The ABM mindset consists of describing a 
system from the perspective of its constituent units.” This type of “microscopic modeling” 
involves modeling a system as a collective of semi-autonomous individuals making decisions 
(Bonabeau, 2002). Agents within the system are given simple rules for decision-making at the 
individual level; depending on these rules, agents can interact with others and react to changes in 
the environment (Gilbert, 2004). Emergence, a key concept in agent-based modeling, is present 
when these local interactions can give rise to interesting, and unexpected, macro-phenomena due 
to agents’ adaptive behaviour.  
A further advantage of agent-based models is that they avoid the issue of reflexivity, where the 
problem shifts as solutions are applied, in a fashion similar to wicked problems (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973), because the simulations provide a controlled environment that allows for policy 
experiments. ABMs are also useful studying situations where real experiments would endanger 
subjects and therefore be unethical, for example, modeling the spread of disease (Louie & 
Carley, 2008). Furthermore, the incremental nature of building social computational models 
allows for continued refinement, repurposing, and data collection as new insights are gained. 
Although these simulation models may be used for predictive purposes, that is not their only use. 
Such models, even if stylized, can be used to provide insight into hypothetical policy scenarios 
(Epstein, 2008). What follows is a basic description of our stylized restaurant inspection 
simulation model. It has been used to compare and evaluate two relevant food safety policy 
scenarios.  
3.5 Model Overview, Design Concepts, and Details  
The Overview, Design Concepts and Details (ODD) framework has been suggested as a 
foundation for describing agent-based models in a consistent, detailed manner so as to facilitate 
re-implementation (Railsback & Grimm, 2012). The ODD protocol will be used in this section to 
describe the simulation model and environment.  
62 
 
The restaurant inspection model was implemented in the NetLogo32 (version 5.0.1) software. As 
a purposely designed agent-based software package, NetLogo supports three kinds of agents. 
These are referred to as turtles, patches, and links. Turtles are mobile agents and are used here to 
represent consumers and inspectors. Patches are locations (on a grid) as defined in the NetLogo 
computational environment. These have been used here to represent restaurants. Finally, link 
agents were not necessary to model this particular problem. 
Purpose: The purpose of the model is to create a stylized food safety inspection system and 
compare two relevant policy scenarios. The first scenario incorporates elements of the current 
inspection system in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan.33 In this case, restaurants are 
inspected by local health authorities and are assigned a re-inspection priority on a scale of low, 
moderate or high depending on risk factors identified during the inspection procedure. The 
second scenario to be examined builds on the first by giving consumers access to the re-
inspection priority scores, and also incorporates elements of risk aversion in consumer choices.34 
Each scenario is evaluated based on the number of inspected restaurants, number of 
contaminated restaurants, and number of sick consumers over the course of the model run.  
Entities, state variables and scales: The model contains three kinds of agents: consumers, 
inspectors, and restaurants. Consumers are endowed with state variables. These describe; i) 
whether they are sick, ii) whether they belong to an at-risk group, iii) the range over which they 
can travel, iv) their choice of next destination, v) a list of restaurants that have made them sick in 
the past, and vi) a count of how long they stay sick. In the second scenario, a risk aversion 
parameter is added for the consumer. In turn, the inspector only has a state variable describing 
their geographic range of operations. Finally, restaurants are defined by a global variable that 
describes whether or not a given patch is a restaurant, and also possess state variables describing 
where they are located, whether they are contaminated, their re-inspection priority, and whether 
they are compliant. Patches in the computational environment that are not defined as restaurants 
represent empty space. As in most NetLogo models, the computational environment is a torus 
that measures 33x33 grid squares with a central origin point, comprised of 1089 patches. 
                                                 
32 NetLogo is available here: https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/ 
33 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4304/version/1/view 
34 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4300/version/2/view 
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Realizations of the model last for 75 time steps. The temporal scale of a time step and spatial 
scale of a patch are not specified.   
Process overview and scheduling: The following processes take place once per time step in the 
following order.  
a) Contamination spread: The likelihood of restaurants becoming contaminated depends on 
whether or not they comply with regulations. Restaurants that are compliant have a 0.5% 
chance of becoming contaminated each time step, but restaurants that are not compliant 
have a 3% chance of becoming contaminated each time step.  Restaurants that become 
contaminated change their contaminated variable from 0 to 1. This is shown visually in 
the model by changing the colour of the restaurant to red.  
b) Consume: Consumers who are not sick select a restaurant within their operating range 
that does not belong to their current list of ‘bad restaurants’ (places where they previously 
became ill) and move there to eat. If the consumer lands on a contaminated restaurant 
they have a chance of becoming sick, which also varies depending on whether they 
belong to an at-risk group. If the consumer becomes sick, they update their list of ‘bad 
restaurants’ and remain sick for a specified number of time steps, depending on whether 
the agent is part of an at-risk group. In the second scenario, the consumer also behaves in 
a risk averse manner for fifteen time steps after healing, meaning that they will only go to 
low re-inspection priority restaurants. If there are no suitable restaurants, i.e. restaurants 
that are not on the consumer’s ‘bad restaurants’ list, or, if the consumer has healed within 
fifteen time steps, are also at the lowest priority for re-inspection, within the consumer’s 
range, the consumer simply wanders to look for restaurants in future time steps. 
c) Test: Inspector agents prioritize restaurants based on three levels of re-inspection priority. 
Each time step they select a restaurant to inspect. They first choose high priority 
restaurants within their range, then moderate, then low. If the chosen restaurant is 
contaminated, the inspector fixes this by changing the restaurant’s contaminated variable 
from 1 to 0, and subsequently raises the re-inspection priority of that restaurant. If there is 
no contamination upon inspection, the inspector lowers the restaurant’s re-inspection 
priority (if possible).    
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d) Heal: Consumers that have been sick for three time steps heal and then re-circulate. If 
they belong to an at-risk group, it takes five time steps to heal.  
Design Concepts: Since this model represents a stylized restaurant inspection system, much of its 
design has been informed by the food safety literature. The following basic principles are 
incorporated into the design of the current model.   
Embedded supply chain: Producers, distributors and suppliers that make up the global supply 
chain are not explicitly observed in the model. Since consumers only directly interact with the 
supply chain at the retail level and the model focuses on restaurant inspections, only restaurants 
are included. Grover and Dausch (2000, as cited by Knight et al., 2009) estimate that a foodborne 
illness outbreak could cost food service outlets $100,000 and up to a 30% loss in sales due to 
decreased consumer trust. During a 1993 E. coli outbreak associated with 73 Jack in the Box 
restaurants in the US, 700 people became sick, and four children died. Although the 
contamination likely occurred during processing, the restaurant was held responsible for 
improper preparation35 and lost US $160 million in decreased sales, recall and legal costs in the 
18 months following the outbreak (Knight, Worosz, & Todd, 2007, pp. 476–478). Even though a 
restaurant may not actually be at fault for contaminating a food product, in this model if they 
serve the product to customers they bear responsibility.  
At-risk population: As noted, people who are elderly, very young, pregnant, or 
immunocompromised are more prone to foodborne illnesses and often suffer more severe 
consequences should they become sick (Gerba et al., 1996). For example, Listeria 
monocytogenes has a high mortality rate in high-risk individuals (up to 30%) and pregnant 
women who become infected with listeriosis may miscarry (Ramaswamy et al., 2007). In this 
model, 30% of consumer agents were designated as being at risk. This level was based on 2011 
Canadian census data on the number of Canadians five and under, and over age 60 (Statistics 
Canada, 2013). The number of pregnant women in the model was extrapolated from the census 
using the number of children under the age of one. The number of individuals suffering from 
diseases that contribute to immune-compromised status were available prior to 2011 but not in a 
                                                 
35 E. coli is killed by high temperatures, so proper preparation at the end of the supply chain would have limited the 
outbreak. 
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useful format. To avoid double-counting, this data was excluded, but the final level used in the 
model was rounded up to 30% from the prior estimates based on age and pregnancy (see Table 
3.1). We recognize that this estimate is incomplete and that the total number of at-risk 
individuals in Canada is likely to be even higher.  
Table 3.1 At-risk population36 
Total Canadian Population 33,476,690 
Adults over 60 6,997,725 
Children 5 and under 2,241,840 
Pregnant women 367,930 
Total at risk 9,607,495 
Percentage of population 28.70% 
 
In addition, exactly what level of contamination in a food product is unsafe and will thus 
translate into illness is unclear (Rawson & Becker, 2004). Therefore, any parameter for the 
probability of contracting an illness if a consumer goes to a contaminated restaurant is 
necessarily difficult to justify. The main point we seek to emphasize is that all else equal, the at-
risk population is more likely to become ill from exposure to a contaminated restaurant. In this 
context, the probability of an at-risk consumer becoming sick from exposure is set at 0.3 whereas 
we assume the rest of the population has a probability of 0.15 of becoming ill given exposure. 
Additionally, at risk consumers remain sick for five time steps as opposed to three, to reflect the 
more severe consequences of foodborne illness for high risk individuals.  
Consumer avoidance: Restaurant food is an experience good in that its quality cannot be 
ascertained prior to consumption (Henson et al., 2006). One survey that investigated consumers’ 
perception of restaurant food safety found that 56.4% of consumers stopped frequenting a 
restaurant based on food safety concerns (Henson et al., 2006, p. 285). In addition, research 
conducted by the Food Standards Association in the UK indicates that, if individuals had 
concerns about hygiene, up to 70% of respondents would not purchase again from a food service 
outlet (as cited by Choi et al., 2011). In this model, this concept of avoidance has been 
                                                 
36 Author’s calculations based on The Canadian Population: Age and Sex from Census 2011 (Statistics Canada, 
2013).  
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incorporated in a simplified way. Consumers that have become sick simply do not return to that 
restaurant. While a bit extreme, it does capture the notion of consumer memory and is not 
completely out of touch with actual reactions to this issue. This assumption is made recognizing 
that in reality, consumers may not be able to directly pinpoint the cause of foodborne disease, or 
may not realize that they have been affected by a foodborne illness if it is a mild case. Further 
research to determine the exact factors that would cause consumers to return to a restaurant 
where they had hygiene concerns will be needed to refine this assumption in the model.  
Risk aversion: Consumers in the second or alternative scenario will only go to restaurants with a 
low re-inspection priority rating for fifteen time steps after healing. This is consistent with 
hysteria and indifference swings (Beck, 1992) and the observed tendency of consumers to 
gradually resume prior consumption patterns following an outbreak (Bocker & Hanf, 2000).  
Asymmetric information: One assumption used in the model is that consumers and inspectors are 
unable to tell if a store is contaminated prior to arrival. This assumption is driven by the notion 
of asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). Elements of a restaurant that are relevant to safety, 
such as the cleanliness of food preparation and storage areas, are generally hidden from 
consumers, providing a further element of asymmetric information (Filion & Powell, 2009). 
However, the simulation allows for this fundamental asymmetry to be gradually eliminated, 
depending on agent type and scenario. In the first or base scenario, do recall that inspectors are 
privy to additional information in the form of the re-inspection priority levels. In the second or 
alternative scenario, consumers are able to see these levels as well, choosing only those 
restaurants with a low re-inspection priority following healing.  
The model’s key results and outputs include the number of sick consumers, the number of sick 
and at-risk consumers, the number of consumers that never get sick, the number of inspected and 
contaminated restaurants, and the number of restaurants for each re-inspection priority level. 
Most of the results seem to arise because of the rules and assumptions of the model. However, 
the reduction in variability seen in the second scenario is likely an emergent result that requires 
further discussion.  
Consumers adapt their behaviour by updating the list of bad restaurants and avoiding these 
locations in the future, even if an inspector has inspected the restaurant. This captures the 
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consumer objective of avoiding sickness. In the alternative scenario, consumers further pursue 
this objective by only visiting low-risk restaurants following illness, a behaviour motivated by 
risk aversion and imposed by the model’s rules. In the current model, there is no adaptive or 
learning behaviour exhibited by restaurants or inspectors. Given that some literature has shown 
that the introduction of grade score cards in Los Angeles County restaurants led to increases in 
inspection scores (Jin & Leslie, 2003), some form of adaptive restaurant behaviour should be 
introduced in future versions of this model.  
Inspectors have different sensing abilities than consumers in the baseline scenario. Inspectors are 
able to observe the re-inspection priority level of a restaurant and search for a restaurant to 
inspect based on this criterion. Consumers are only able to use this information in the alternative 
scenario. Importantly, neither consumers nor inspectors can tell if a restaurant is contaminated 
prior to arriving at it. In addition, consumers cannot sense whether a restaurant has recently been 
inspected or whether consumers near them are sick (from the restaurant).  
Consumers and inspectors do not interact in the model. Consumers interact with restaurants by 
visiting them, but they do not interact with other consumers who may also be present at that 
location at that time step. Inspectors interact with restaurants by inspecting them and changing 
their re-inspection priority and reversing contamination scores.  
Stochasticity has been incorporated into the simulation in a number of places. Consumers are 
randomly assigned a travel range between three and eight units. This is based on the assumption 
that consumers have differing access to restaurants depending on where they live and their 
transportation options. Consumers with a larger range can move around the environment faster 
and have more choices available to them each time step. As well, consumers that cannot find any 
suitable restaurants in their range adjust their heading randomly and wander. Consumers are also 
randomly assigned to either the at-risk or normal population groups. Probabilities also determine 
whether a consumer will get sick at a contaminated restaurant, while a Bernoulli distribution is 
used to select which restaurants will be contaminated each time step.  
BehaviorSpace, a built-in NetLogo extension for running simulation experiments, is used to track 
model output at the end of each model run. The data was then analyzed in R (version 2.15.1). 
This data includes: 
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 The number of sick consumers  
 The number of sick, at-risk consumers  
 The number of contaminated restaurants that inspectors inspect 
 The number of restaurants that are contaminated 
 The number of what we call “naïve” consumers (those that have never gotten sick over 
the course of the model run)  
 The number of restaurants at each level of re-inspection priority 
Initialization: Model realizations are executed with 2000 consumers (30% of which belong to the 
at-risk group) and 100 restaurants.37 There is one inspector in the model. Each realization lasts 
75 time steps. The percentage of compliant restaurants is initially set at 60%, and is scaled up to 
70%, 80% and 90%. For each change in the simulation model (i.e., for each increase in the 
percentage of compliant restaurants) the simulation is run 100 times, so each “experiment” lasts 
for 400 realizations.  
Consumers: Consumers have their travel range set between 3 and 8 units, while their sickness 
variable, heal counter and risk aversion variables are all initially set to 0. Thirty percent of the 
consumers are randomly assigned to the at-risk group. Initially, individual lists for destination 
and bad restaurants are empty. Consumers are then scattered with equal probability throughout 
the operating environment.  
Inspectors: All inspectors have a range of 10 units. They are initially scattered with equal 
probability throughout the environment.  
Patches: Of the 1089 patches in the environment, 100 are randomly selected to serve as 
restaurants, with their restaurant variable set to unity to indicate this. These patches are then 
added to a patch-set. Finally, restaurant patches are randomly assigned with a re-inspection level 
of 0, 1, or 2, 0 being low priority and 2 being highest priority.  
                                                 
37 The actual density of restaurants to consumers in Canada is approximately 1 to 350 (Statistics Canada, 2006). 
However, given the computational limits of NetLogo, this version of the model could not be scaled up to that level. 
Further work is ongoing with implementing a variation of this model in a software package called AnyLogic where 
the number of agents can be scaled up to more realistic levels. 
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3.6 Model Results 
Initially, both model scenarios (that is, where consumers do not have access to re-inspection 
priority scores, and where they do and display risk averse behaviour for 15 time steps following 
healing) were run for 150 time steps and runs were measured at every step. Given that there was 
a ‘burn-in’ period of about 35-40 time steps, we decided to end the model run at 75 time steps 
and collect data at the end of the model runs. Both scenarios were repeated 100 times at each 
setting of 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% compliant restaurants. The Kruskal-Wallis test was 
conducted to check the statistical significance of each increase in the percentage of compliant 
restaurants within each scenario, and this was followed by post-hoc analysis using pair-wise 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, using the Holm correction to account for multiple comparisons. 
Unless otherwise stated, the pairwise analysis results are statistically significant (p <.05). For 
comparisons between scenarios, Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests were used to check for statistical 
significance of consumer risk aversion at each setting of 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% compliant 
restaurants (see Table 3.4).  
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Table 3.2 Kruskal-Wallis results from both scenarios 
  No consumer access to inspection scores 
  
0.6 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.7 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.8 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.9 Compliant 
Restaurants 
Kruskal-Wallis  
(3 df) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD Chi-Sq p-value 
Sick 
Consumers 412.1 64.5 353.1 75.3 328.2 56.8 267.3 59 164.8 p<.001 
Sick, At Risk 
Consumers 205.2 30.7 179.1 37.7 167.3 26.7 139.2 29.8 151 p<.001 
Naïve 
Consumers 63.6 55.4 123.2 152.9 146 100.6 267.2 141.8 169.4 p<.001 
Inspected 
Stores 9.6 2.1 9.6 2 9.3 2.3 8.7 2 9.8 
p= 
0.02 
Contaminated 
Stores 45.5 4.8 38.6 4.1 34.4 3.9 28.4 4.1 285 p<.001 
Low Risk 
Stores 47.9 7.2 50.3 9.3 52.8 8.4 55.3 7.2 438 p<.001 
Moderate 
Risk Stores 51.6 7.2 49.3 9.3 46.9 8.4 44.3 7.2 41.4 p<.001 
High Risk 
Stores 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 13.1 
p= 
0.004 
  Full consumer access to inspection scores 
  
0.6 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.7 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.8 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.9 Compliant 
Restaurants 
Kruskal-Wallis 
(3 df) 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD Chi-Sq p-value 
Sick 
Consumers 418.9 45.9 385.8 45.8 342.1 47.4 297.9 41.2 209.5 p<.001 
Sick, At Risk 
consumers 206.4 24.1 192.6 24.2 175.2 26.1 154.7 21.4 166.7 p<.001 
Naïve 
Consumers 51.4 20.7 84.4 28.8 138.4 47.5 212.6 78.2 287.5 p<.001 
Inspected 
Stores 10.1 2.1 9.5 2.2 9 2.5 8.6 2.2 24.6 p<.001 
Contaminated 
Stores 44.7 4.2 38.8 3.9 33.8 4.2 28.7 4.1 278.3 p<.001 
Low Risk 
Stores 47.7 8 50.9 8.3 54.5 8.4 56 8.5 51.6 p<.001 
Moderate 
Risk Stores 51.9 7.9 48.8 8.3 45.3 8.5 43.8 8.6 49.4 p<.001 
High Risk 
Stores 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 10.6 
p= 
0.014 
 
In the first scenario, consumers do not behave in a risk averse manner following an illness. 
Interestingly, the mean number of sick consumers is slightly lower compared to the second 
scenario, where consumers are risk averse by only going to restaurants with a low re-inspection 
priority for 15 time steps following an illness (see Figure 3.1). However, note that this difference 
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between scenarios is only significant (p < .05) when there are 70% and 90% compliant 
restaurants in the model (see Table 3.4). Also, even though the mean number of sick consumers 
is slightly higher in the second scenario, the overall variation in the number of sick consumers is 
reduced substantially. 
Figure 3.1 Sick consumers, both scenarios 
 
The results for the number of consumers in the at-risk group who experience sickness are very 
similar: in the first scenario, the mean number of sick, at-risk consumers is slightly lower, but 
there is less variation in the second scenario (see Figure 3.2).  However, this difference between 
scenarios is only statistically significant when there are 90% compliant restaurants (p < .001). 
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Figure 3.2 Sick, at-risk consumers, both scenarios 
 
Generally, the results from the first scenario are more skewed and often leptokurtic, whereas the 
results from the second scenario were less skewed and closer to a mesokurtic, or normal, 
distribution. A leptokurtic distribution is more peaked than normal and has fat tails, meaning that 
there are higher densities of values at the extremes. This phenomenon was most apparent in the 
numbers of naïve consumers (see Figure 3.3), that is, the number of consumers that never 
became ill throughout the course of the model run. 
Table 3.3 Skewness and kurtosis test results for count naive consumers 
No consumer access to inspection scores 
  Skewness Kurtosis Standard Error 
0.6 Compliant Restaurants 2.41 8.39 5.54 
0.7 Compliant Restaurants 5.89 43.38 15.29 
0.8 Compliant Restaurants 2.61 12.08 10.06 
0.9 Compliant Restaurants 0.72 -0.33 14.18 
Full consumer access to inspection scores 
  Skewness Kurtosis Standard Error 
0.6 Compliant Restaurants 0.81 1.13 2.07 
0.7 Compliant Restaurants 0.8 0.39 2.89 
0.8 Compliant Restaurants 1.05 1.81 4.75 
0.9 Compliant Restaurants 0.91 0.74 7.82 
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Figure 3.4 shows the numbers of inspected restaurants in each scenario. The post-hoc analysis 
showed that, for the first scenario, showed that the differences between 60% and 70% compliant 
restaurants, between 60% and 80% compliant restaurants, between 70% and 80% compliant 
restaurants, and between 80% and 90% compliant restaurants were not statistically significant (p 
> .05). For the second scenario, the post-hoc analysis showed that the differences between 60% 
and 70% compliant restaurants, between 70% and 80% compliant restaurants, and between 80% 
and 90% compliant restaurants, were not statistically significant (p > .05). When the two 
scenarios were compared (see Table 3.3), none of the differences were statistically significant (p 
> .05). As well, for this indicator, the variation was not greatly reduced in the second scenario.  
The number of inspected restaurants appears to decline as compliance increases; this is in part 
due to the model’s construction, since compliant restaurants are less likely to become 
contaminated in the first place.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Naive consumers, both scenarios 
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Figure 3.4 Inspected restaurants, both scenarios 
 
In both scenarios, the number of contaminated restaurants declines as the percentage of 
compliant restaurants increases; this is in part because of the model’s structure, since compliant 
restaurants are less likely to become contaminated (see Figure 3.5). The differences between 
scenarios were not statistically significant (p >.05). 
Figure 3.5 Contaminated restaurants, both scenarios
 
Table 3.4 sums up the comparisons between scenarios, divided by percentage of compliant 
restaurants.  
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Table 3.4 Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon results 
  
0.6 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.7 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.8 Compliant 
Restaurants 
0.9 Compliant 
Restaurants 
  
Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon  
Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon  
Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon  
Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon  
  W p-value W p-value W p-value W p-value 
Sick 
Consumers 4805 p= 0.63 3764 
p= 
0.003 4225 
p= 
0.058 3456 p < 0.001 
Sick, At Risk 
consumers 4989 p= 0.98 4019.5 
p= 
0.016 4279 
p= 
0.078 3527.5 p < 0.001 
Naïve 
Consumers 4915.5 p= 0.84 5530.5 p= 0.19 4757 p= 0.55 6005.5 p= 0.014 
Inspected 
Stores 4308.5 p= 0.09 5192.5 p= 0.63 5299.5 p= 0.46 5293.5 p= 0.47 
Contaminated 
Stores 5397 p= 0.33 4864 p= 0.74 5360 p= 0.38 4826 p= 0.67 
Low Risk 
Stores 5142.5 p= 0.73 4916 p= 0.84 4375.5 p= 0.13 4719 p= 0.49 
Moderate Risk 
Stores 4821 p= 0.66 5103.5 p= 0.80 5620.5 p= 0.13 5246.5 p= 0.55 
High Risk 
Stores 5703 
p= 
0.045 4882.5 p= 0.73 5087 p= 0.78 5550 p= 0.07 
 
3.7 Policy Implications and Conclusions  
This study represents the application of a method for policy analysis that can be useful for 
shedding light on risks that typify the risk society, including foodborne illness, although further 
work is needed to improve the system perspective of the ABM featured here. The results from 
the model indicate that, overall, having access to restaurant inspection scores results in a slightly 
higher mean number of sick consumers, but much less variation in the overall number of sick 
consumers, over 100 realizations. This also holds true for the number of sick, at-risk consumers. 
For both scenarios, more compliant restaurants results in fewer sick consumers. As well, 
although there tended to be more naïve consumers when the consumers did not have access to 
inspection scores and therefore did not act in a risk averse way following an illness, these 
distributions tended to be leptokurtic, which indicates a higher probability of outcomes from the 
extremes; the results from the second scenario, when consumers did have access to inspection 
scores and behaved in a risk averse manner for 15 time steps following an illness, were generally 
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much closer to a normal distribution, with more predictable outcomes. Again, in both scenarios, 
a higher percentage of compliant restaurants results in more naïve consumers.  
Our basic findings have implications for policy systems. First of all, the model reflects a basic 
tension between how much policymakers can and should do through regulation and how much 
should come from informing citizens and allowing them to make choices. Although the mean 
number of sick consumers was slightly lower when consumers did not have access to re-
inspection scores, the high degree of variability in outcomes could present a challenge for 
inspectors; it may be preferable to have a slightly higher average number of illnesses, but more 
predictable and steadier outcomes, rather than large swings which could contribute to public 
panic and negative risk perceptions.38 As well, given that many statistical procedures rely on 
assumptions of normality, outcomes that more closely conform to a normal distribution could 
contribute to better understanding of what is going on within the system and better predictive 
capacity from a policy perspective, which would be an advantage despite the slightly higher 
average number of illness.  
Having a higher number of restaurants comply with regulations results in fewer sick consumers; 
empirical evidence shows that disclosing inspection results leads to increases in inspection scores 
(Jin & Leslie, 2003). Although a mechanism for restaurants choosing to comply with regulations 
was not explicitly considered in the model, there is evidence to suggest that disclosing scores 
would increase compliance, while improving transparency in the inspection system which would 
provide consumers with more information to make choices. However, Restaurants Canada, an 
industry lobby group, has indicated that they do not support the use of grades or scores to inform 
consumers about the hygiene of restaurants, indicating that “complex inspection findings based 
on subjective interpretations by individual inspectors cannot accurately or fairly be reduced to a 
single grade” (Griffith-Greene, 2014). The response from industry indicates that government 
intervention would be necessary to encourage transparency within the system. A further 
complicating factor is that restaurant inspections are the responsibility of regional health 
                                                 
38 Although large, widespread outbreaks of foodborne illness are relatively uncommon, it seems likely that they are 
subject to the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), whereby people assume they occur more 
frequently because they are easily recalled. The availability heuristic could influence panic and public risk 
perception related to foodborne illness. 
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authorities or provincial authorities, depending on the province (Government of Canada, 2014); 
thus, there is inconsistent information available across the country depending on what each 
jurisdiction has opted to make public and how.  
The incremental nature of model building will allow for additional exploration of inspection 
methods or information delivery methods in the future, one of the advantages of ABM modeling. 
Some possible extensions for this model include: communication between consumer agents, for 
example, a rumor mill indicating restaurants to avoid; a mechanism that allows restaurants to 
choose whether or not to comply with regulations, which may depend on whether they are 
receiving fewer visits from consumers; mechanisms that allow for the restaurant’s level of 
compliance to vary over time; for example, this could mimic the effect of more experienced staff 
working, or hygiene measures sliding somewhat when the restaurant is extremely busy; or 
incorporating agents who ‘learn-by-doing.’ The ability to incorporate heterogeneity in agents’ 
adaptive behaviour is a further advantage of ABM. 
As well, this model needs further analysis and verification. At this point many assumptions are 
embedded in this stylized model, including those about the probability of illness in at-risk and 
typical consumer populations, the connection between re-inspection scores, compliance and 
contamination probability, and consumer behavior. The assumption that risk averse behaviour is 
homogeneous throughout the population, in particular, requires further investigation. To truly 
provide transparency and gain insight into this aspect of consumer behaviour, experiments could 
be conducted with consumers to determine which method of inspection information delivery is 
preferred and works most effectively. This avenue for research in the area has been mentioned 
before in the literature (Filion & Powell, 2009). Results from such experiments could then be 
used to inform future versions of an agent-based model through parameter setting and proper 
scaling of the analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4  
AGENT-BASED MODELS AND HEALTH-ORIENTED MOBILE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1 Abstract 
Objectives:  Using system science techniques, we investigate the potential for health-oriented 
mobile technologies to improve the surveillance system for foodborne illness, using an agent-
based model as a proof of concept.  
Methods: An agent-based model features consumers, restaurants, and an inspector. Three 
scenarios were developed to include a sentinel population equipped with a mobile technology: 
firstly, the mobile technology allows sentinels to report instances of mild to moderate symptoms 
of foodborne illness (namely, diarrhea and vomiting); secondly, the device’s location sensors 
report which restaurants sentinels have frequented more accurately than retrospective data 
collection; and thirdly, both aspects are combined.   
Results: The model results indicate that a substantial reduction in the number of clinical and mild 
to moderate cases can be achieved with a sentinel population of just 1%, when the sentinels self-
report symptoms of foodborne illness. These reductions were somewhat larger in the scenario 
involving sensor-based location records. However, the scenario where sentinels only had sensor-
based location records for restaurants they had visited, but did not self-report symptoms, was not 
successful. 
Conclusions: The model supports the application of health-oriented mobile technology in 
foodborne illness surveillance, and lends insight into the number of sentinels needed to 
effectively implement a pilot study using this technology.   
4.2 Introduction 
Each year in the United States, there are an estimated 47.8 million foodborne illnesses, resulting 
in 127,839 hospitalizations, and 3,037 deaths. The vast majority (80%) are caused by unspecified 
agents (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014a). The Public Health Agency of 
Canada estimates that approximately 4 million people, or 1 in 8 Canadians, become sick each 
year (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2013). Based on these estimates, an enhanced cost-of-
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illness model that incorporates pain, suffering, and disability, as well as medical cost and illness-
related mortality, found that the economic burden of foodborne illness in the United States was 
$77.7 billion (Scharff, 2012). Data on the full extent of foodborne illness is incomplete because 
many cases are mild, so those affected do not seek medical treatment; of those who do, cases are 
not always confirmed through laboratory testing and reported to the appropriate health 
department (Buzby & Roberts, 2009; Schlundt, 2002).  A further area of uncertainty is 
attributing diseases to specific foods (Batz et al., 2005); however, eating in restaurants has been 
identified as a risk factor for foodborne illness (T. F. Jones & Angulo, 2006). The uncertainty 
associated with estimates of foodborne illness and its associated costs impedes the development 
of effective interventions and policies to prevent foodborne illnesses.  
Recently, there has been increasing interest in the application of crowdsourcing and mobile 
technology to complement existing public health surveillance. In the field of foodborne illness, 
researchers have linked Tweets about foodborne illness to GPS tags from mobile phones 
indicating restaurants, and then correlated the data with health department inspections (Sadilek, 
Brennan, Kautz, & Silenzio, 2013). Another project used reviews on the website Yelp to find 
unreported cases where customers experienced foodborne illness in New York City.  In 
partnership with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), reviews were 
triangulated with 311 reports on restaurants, and in some cases DOHMH investigation was 
required. Three outbreaks were identified that had not previously been reported (Harrison et al., 
2014).  These studies have reported some successes, but the authors also noted that they are 
extremely labour intensive and could overwhelm local health departments. Most recently, IBM 
has built a system designed to help food retailers and public health officials detect the most likely 
sources of food contamination to assist with foodborne illness investigations: the system uses the 
location of supermarket food items sold each week to identify a set of possible sources that are 
likely causing the outbreak, using as few as 10 case reports. By integrating existing retail and 
public health data, public health investigators can see maps, distributions of potential foods, and 
case reports and lab reports from clinical cases. Additional reports feed into the algorithm used in 
order to update the probability that suspected food products are causing the illnesses (IBM, 
2014).   
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Although mobile health technology is a growing field with many applications for gathering 
health data that has generated much research interest recently, designing such studies is time 
consuming, expensive and difficult. To avoid such pitfalls, we were interested in using an agent-
based model (ABM), a simulation  methodology that allows for many interacting agents to reveal 
emergent properties of systems (G. T. Jones, 2007), to investigate the potential for 
crowdsourcing study design and to develop a proof of concept.  ABM has grown in popularity in 
the social and health sciences for its ability to simulate possible outcomes and test alternative 
scenarios. We have employed an ABM to evaluate the possibilities for an intervention: using a 
mobile technology that would crowdsource data on foodborne illness.  
4.3 Methods 
The purpose of the ABM39 is to investigate the effect on health and investigation length of a 
small proportion of the population, referred to as sentinels, equipped with a mobile technology 
that allows sentinels to collect data on visited restaurants and/or report mild to moderate signs of 
foodborne illness, and then transmits this information to public health inspectors in the event of 
an outbreak. 
The model contains three different entities: consumers, restaurants, and an inspector. The 
consumers have two important state variables: whether or not they are sick, and if they are, 
whether they are experiencing either mild to moderate or severe symptoms; and whether or not 
they are a sentinel. Consumers also have parameters that govern how frequently they eat in 
restaurants and whether or not they practice good food handling habits when cooking at home. 
Restaurants may either be in a contaminated or uncontaminated state; one restaurant is 
contaminated at the model’s initialization. The inspector begins in the routine inspection state, 
and if an outbreak occurs, it changes its inspection strategy to focus on restaurants most 
frequently reported as having been visited by ill consumers.  
The model was implemented in AnyLogic (version 6.9.0). Model time is continuous and 
measured in days, and there is no fixed stop time – the model stops when the inspector finds the 
contaminated restaurant. The model is does not depend on spatial relationships, but the 
                                                 
39 View this model in the CoMSES Model Library: https://www.openabm.org/model/4325/version/1/view  
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implementation in AnyLogic used some spatial elements to improve understanding and allow for 
easier communication and debugging.  
The following processes occur continuously, not sequentially. The inspector conducts routine 
inspections by first forming a collection of all restaurants, ordered randomly. The inspector goes 
through the list in a round-robin fashion, inspecting restaurants at a rate of one per day.  The 
inspector has a 50% chance of correctly identifying a contaminated restaurant; this estimate is 
meant to reflect the fact that inspectors may inspect a restaurant when it is less busy, and sloppy 
errors in food handling may be less likely to occur, or when staff members who are more safety 
conscious may be working. A contaminated restaurant will comply with routine inspection 50% 
of the time. If the inspector correctly identifies the affected restaurant during a routine 
inspection, and if the restaurant complies with the inspector, the model realization ends.   
Consumers eat once per day either at home or at a restaurant. The likelihood of a consumer 
becoming ill depends on where they are eating; if they are eating at home, their likelihood of 
becoming ill depends on whether they practice good food handling, and if they are eating at a 
restaurant, it depends on whether they have been to the contaminated restaurant in the model. 
The risks associated with food handling practices were derived from empirical data; for further 
details, please see the calculations summarized in Appendix A.  
Once a consumer has been exposed to a pathogen, either in the home or in a restaurant, the 
consumer will transition from the healthy state to the illness exposure state, where they remain 
for one day in model time. Next, the consumer either experiences mild to moderate or severe 
symptoms. Symptoms severe enough to warrant a visit to the doctor and subsequent reporting to 
public health were assumed to occur in about 0.5% of cases and last for five days. Mild to 
moderate cases, that were not reported to a physician and hence were unrecognized by public 
health authorities, were assumed to last for two days.  
Two severe cases will trigger an outbreak investigation. If an outbreak is declared, the severely 
ill consumers update a list of visited restaurants.  Recollection is treated as imperfect, as 
consumers have a certain chance per day of forgetting restaurant locations that they have visited, 
and they are more likely to forget restaurant visits which occurred more distantly in the past. The 
consumers then pass their list of visited restaurants to the inspector, who maintains a count of 
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reports originating in each restaurant. Once an outbreak has been triggered, and on an ongoing 
basis until the contaminated restaurant is identified, the inspector will seek to visit the restaurant 
with the highest cumulative count of reports that has not yet been visited as part of the outbreak 
investigation. This process continues until the inspector correctly identifies the contaminated 
restaurant, which ends the model realization. During an outbreak investigation, the model treats 
the inspector as capable of recognizing the contaminated restaurant with perfect sensitivity and 
specificity; the elements of uncertainty in identification and compliance that are present in 
routine inspections are not used in outbreak investigations, because inspectors have more 
information to guide their investigation and could shut down the affected restaurant. 
Sentinel consumers behave in accordance with all of the above consumer processes, with minor 
changes depending on the scenario. The first scenario involves sentinels whose mobile devices 
track which restaurants have been visited, allowing sentinels to report with greater accuracy than 
consumers who must remember where they have been, and sentinels report mild to moderate 
symptoms of foodborne disease. In the second scenario, sentinels report mild to moderate 
symptoms, and report which restaurants they have visited with the same imperfect memory as 
non-sentinel consumers once an outbreak has been triggered. In both of these scenarios, four 
sentinels reporting any symptoms, or two severe cases, will trigger an outbreak. In the third 
scenario, sentinels do not report symptoms; however, if they experience mild to moderate illness, 
they provide visited restaurant data to the inspector once two severe cases have been reported. 
These scenarios will hereafter be referred to as scenarios one, two and three, respectively.  
An output file is created that keeps track of the time of the first severe case, the time between the 
first severe case and the inspector beginning an outbreak investigation, the length of the 
investigation, the count of severe illnesses, the count of mild to moderate illnesses, the number of 
sentinel consumers who experienced mild to moderate illness, the number of consumers who 
become sick eating at home, the  number of consumers who become sick from eating at 
restaurants, the total time length of the simulation, and the number of routine inspections. 
However, only a subset of these indicators is discussed here.  
The model is initialized with 5000 consumers and 100 restaurants, one of which is contaminated. 
There is one inspector in the model. Upon model initialization, consumers are placed in 
categories based on frequency of eating in restaurants: 6.7% of consumers eat out daily, 30.9% 
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three times a week, 23% once a week (Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association, 
2010), and the remaining 39.4% of consumers visit a restaurant once every two weeks. Each 
consumer selects a subset of 10 restaurants with uniform probability to form their list of possible 
restaurants to visit. Consumers are also randomly assigned to either practice good or poor 
hygiene while cooking at home: 20% of consumers practice good food handling habits, and 80% 
do not. Studies observing food safety practices while preparing meals in the home (Anderson, 
Shuster, Hansen, Levy, & Volk, 2004; Redmond, Griffith, Slader, & Humphrey, 2004) were 
used to inform this aspect of the model; the data reported by these studies is quite nuanced, so 
the 80/20 figure is an abstraction.  The per day chance of illness from eating a home meal 
prepared with good food safety practices, as backed out from empirical data, is 
0.0001511385888.40  We conducted 1000 realizations with 0% (baseline), and then 1%, 2%, and 
4% sentinels for each of the three scenarios.  
4.4 Results 
The results from the model were analyzed in R (version 2.15.1). The Kruskal-Wallis rank sum 
test was used to compare the results within each scenario with 1% of the population acting as 
sentinels, 2%, and 4%, to the baseline (see Table 11), as well as the results between scenarios 
with the same percentages of the population as sentinels (see Table 12). Next, post-hoc analysis 
using pairwise Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests was completed, using the Holm correction to 
account for multiple comparisons. Unless otherwise stated, the pairwise analysis results are 
statistically significant (p <.001).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 See Appendix A for details.  
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Table 4.1 Kruskal-Wallis test results for all scenarios, by sentinel percentage 
  Scenario 1: Sentinels Report Mild to moderate Symptoms and Restaurant Visits 
  Baseline 1% Sentinels 2% Sentinels 4% Sentinels Kruskal-Wallis 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Chi-sq 
(3 DF) p-value 
Length of 
Investigation 18.6 51.9 10.2 34.4 10.8 28.3 6.4 15.8 65.4 p<.001 
Count Clinical 
Illnesses 1.3 1 1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.7 347 p<.001 
Count Mild 
Illnesses 249.2 205.4 199 138.8 155.4 100.4 92.7 53.2 556.7 p<.001 
Count Sentinel 
Illnesses 0 0 2 1.6 2.9 1.7 3.6 1.5 2137.1 p<.001 
Overall Model 
Time 230.5 187.5 184.3 127 144.1 93.1 86.4 49.5 567.1 p<.001 
# of Routine 
Inspections 211.9 177 174.1 119.2 133.3 84.3 80 45.2 562.9 p<.001 
  Scenario 2: Sentinels Report Mild to moderate Symptoms 
  Baseline 1% Sentinels 2% Sentinels 4% Sentinels Kruskal-Wallis  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Chi-sq 
(3 DF) p-value 
Length  of 
Investigation 18.6 51.9 27.8 57.6 26.8 45.7 25.2 36.9 215.5 p<.001 
Count Clinical 
Illnesses 1.3 1 10 1 0.8 0. 0.6 0.8 270.7 p<.001 
Count Mild 
Illnesses 249.2 205.4 214.4 153.1 164.8 102.7 112.5 63.9 369.1 p<.001 
Count Sentinel 
Illnesses 0 0 2.2 1.82 3.3 2.1 4.4 2.3 2099.1 p<.001 
Overall Model 
Time 230.5 187.5 198.3 140.5 153.31 94.4 105.3 59.3 368.1 p<.001 
# of Routine 
Inspections 211.9 177 170.5 119.6 126.5 77.9 80.1 45.1 544.1 p<.001 
  Scenario 3: Sentinels Report Restaurant Visits 
  Baseline 1% Sentinels 2% Sentinels 4% Sentinels Kruskal-Wallis  
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Chi-sq 
(3 DF) p-value 
Length of 
Investigation 18.6 51.9 9.1 30.1 5.7 24 2 7 54 p<.001 
Count Clinical 
Illnesses 1.3 1 1.2 1 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 5.1 p=.16 
Count Mild 
Illnesses 249.2 205.4 245.6 196.8 236.4 188.7 234.6 185.8 1.6 p=.66 
Count Sentinel 
Illnesses 0 0 2.5 2.5 4.8 4.6 9.3 8 2191.5 p<.001 
Overall Model 
Time 230.5 187.5 198.3 140.5 153.3 94.4 105.3 59.3 368.1 p<.001 
# of Routine 
Inspections 211.9 177 217.7 178.6 212.6 171.9 214.4 169.7 1.2 p=.74 
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In scenario one, where sentinels report both mild to moderate symptoms and visited restaurants, 
the number of sick consumers declines as the percentage of sentinels increases. The length of 
time required to identify the affected restaurant in an outbreak investigation also decreases as 
sentinels are added, and the variability is substantially reduced.  However, the Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test showed  no statistically significant effect of increasing the amount of sentinels 
from 2% to 4% (p > .05). A related measure, the overall length of time that passes until the 
model run ends, also declines; because clinical cases are rare, relying on a second clinical case in 
order to trigger an outbreak results in longer model run times, which also means that there is 
more time for a greater number of consumers to become ill. When sentinels can report mild to 
moderate symptoms to trigger an outbreak, the outbreak investigation occurs earlier and is 
completed more quickly because inspectors have access to additional information on visited 
restaurants. 
Figure 4.1 Mild to moderate cases, all scenarios 
 
In scenario two, where sentinels report mild to moderate symptoms, the number of sick 
consumers decreases as sentinels are added, although the decrease is not quite as substantial as in 
scenario one. The difference between the baseline and having 1% sentinels for the number of 
consumers who became ill from home cooking, ill from eating at restaurants, and the overall 
length of time of the model was significant (p < .05 ). The most interesting result from this 
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scenario was that the length of outbreak investigation for all sentinel percentages was greater 
than for the baseline.  
Figure 4.2 Length of investigation, all scenarios 
 
Scenario three was not successful – there were few statistically significant differences between 
the baseline and sentinels. The difference between the baseline and 1% sentinels for the length of 
investigation was significant (p < .01), but the difference between 2% and 4% sentinels was not 
statistically significant (p > .05). Overall, the outbreak investigations in this scenario were the 
shortest, as seen in Figure 4.2. The difference between the baseline and 1% sentinels was 
statistically significant (p < .05) for the length of time from the beginning of the model when a 
pathogen first appears until the outbreak investigation completes.  
The results from scenario one show the greatest reductions in the number of sick consumers in 
both severe and mild cases (see Figure 4.1). However, this scenario only performs marginally 
better than scenario two; the results between these two scenarios for the number of mild to 
moderate illnesses were not statistically significant with 1% sentinels (p > .05), but was 
significant with 2% sentinels (p < .05) and 4% sentinels (p <.001). Overall, these two scenarios 
performed comparably.  
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Table 4.2 Kruskal-Wallis test results for all scenarios 
 1% Sentinels 2% Sentinels 4% Sentinels 
 Kruskal-Wallis Kruskal-Wallis  Kruskal-Wallis  
 
Chi-sq (2 
DF) p-value 
Chi-sq (2 
DF) p-value 
Chi-sq (2 
DF) p-value 
Length of Investigation 78.3 p<.001 305.1 p<.001 715.3 p<.001 
Count Clinical Illnesses 26.1 p<.001 111.1 p<.001 345.3 p<.001 
Count Mild Illnesses 15.4 p<.001 85.1 p<.001 427.5 p<.001 
Count Sentinel Illnesses 6.1 p<.05 60.4 p<.001 413 p<.001 
Count Sick from Home 
Cooking 15.4 p<.001 87.8 p<.001 490.9 p<.001 
Count Sick from 
Restaurants 15.9 p<.001 82 p<.001 472.6 p<.001 
Overall Model Time 14.5 p<.001 86 p<.001 487.4 p<.001 
Number of Routine 
Inspections 23.6 p<.001 132.6 p<.001 601.4 p<.001 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This model provides a proof of concept for using mobile technology to enhance foodborne 
illness surveillance. We have shown that even a very small proportion of the population serving 
as sentinels can substantially reduce the number of illnesses present in the population, which 
points to the feasibility of the technology.  The model has generated three important insights. 
First, having sentinels report visited restaurants, without reporting mild to moderate symptoms to 
trigger recognition of an outbreak, does not substantially reduce the number of illnesses. Thus, 
we can infer that it is not helpful for the inspector to only receive restaurant reports from 
sentinels; early reports of milder symptoms of foodborne illness that can trigger an outbreak are 
needed for the intervention to have an effect. Second, the model illuminates Peter Drucker’s 
quote, “what gets measured, gets managed” as applied to policy situations. Because we have 
perfect reporting of mild to moderate cases in the model, we can see that although the length of 
investigation is longer when sentinels only report mild to moderate symptoms, fewer people are 
ill overall. However, if a health department were to deploy this technology and were unaware or 
unconvinced of the reduction in illnesses, in part because many of these mild to moderate cases 
are unknown to begin with, they may think that the technology is actually making things worse 
because of the apparent adverse effect on the duration of outbreak investigations. Third, the 
model shows that adding sentinels can result in more stable and predictable levels of sickness 
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within the population, which is likely to be more easily managed by the public health system. 
Wide swings in outcomes that are unpredictable can be taxing on resources and contribute to 
negative public perception of public health and food safety.  
Crowdsourcing offers interesting possibilities for public involvement in public health, as shown 
here and in other recent work (Harrison et al., 2014; M Hashemian, Stanley, Knowles, Calver, & 
Osgood, 2012; Paul & Dredze, 2011; Sadilek et al., 2013). However, there are also limitations 
involving the compliance and honesty of those participating, as well as the potential for 
crowdsourcing initiatives to overburden public officials (Harrison et al., 2014).  
There are also some limitations to this work, including two key assumptions for future research. 
In the model, we have assumed that sentinel consumers carry the device and use it consistently 
all of the time, and that there is always one contaminated restaurant in the model. Given that past 
studies with similar technology have shown less than perfect compliance (M Hashemian et al., 
2012), the true number of sentinels required to show an effect in a pilot study might need to be 
slightly higher, to account for less than perfect compliance and a fuzzier definition of a 
contaminated restaurant.41  Such a pilot study would need to be conducted in collaboration with a 
local health department to ensure their needs were met and that the incoming data would not 
overburden staff members.   
The main advantage of the model presented here is that it provides a starting point for study 
design.  To fully synthesize simulation with novel mobile technology, we would use the data 
resulting from a pilot study deploying mobile technology to collect reports of foodborne illness 
symptoms to further refine and restructure the model’s assumptions. This is especially relevant 
for foodborne illness, because data is uncertain, in part due to under-reporting, and many argue 
that interventions can prevent some cases of foodborne disease (Batz et al., 2005; Buzby & 
Roberts, 2009; Schlundt, 2002). By linking these two tools in a fundamental way, we can 
provide better evidence for decision-making in public health. 
                                                 
41 The percentage of sentinels used in the model could be taken as indicating the fraction of reliably compliant 
individuals; however, the model does not provide assistance with determining how many sentinels would need to be 
recruited in order to achieve this percentage.    
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
Many problems faced by policymakers are complex, meaning that they are not reducible and 
problems arise when they are approached by simple analytical tools. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that policymakers tend to prefer simpler methods, particularly those that are 
less formal and more subjective. The research presented here is fundamentally about adapting, 
adopting, and reducing new policy tools to practice: ABM is just one example. ABM is a method 
that has been touted as having great potential for analyzing policy problems, but has not been 
widely used. The opportunities for using ABM at each stage of the policy cycle were outlined; it 
appears that the method would be most useful at the policy formulation and policy evaluation 
stages, although there may be application at other points depending on the policy problem at 
hand and the rationale for choosing ABM.  
Ensuring safe food is an example of a complex problem: the system is global, exhibits 
interrelated feedback loops, a large number of actors, asymmetric information, and uncertainty. 
Using food safety as an illustrative example, three models representing simplified interactions 
between consumers, retailers and inspectors were developed and analyzed. The first model 
explores three inspection scenarios incorporating access to information: a random inspection 
scenario, a scenario where stores signal with certainty, and a scenario where stores signal with 
errors. The main finding to come from this modeling exercise was that the number of sick 
consumers is greatly reduced by giving consumers and inspectors more information about 
whether a store is contaminated, even if that information may be uncertain.  
The second model incorporated theories on risk and the role of transparency in encouraging 
consumer trust by exploring two scenarios: the first is the status quo, where consumers do not 
have ready access to restaurant inspection scores, whereas the second gives consumers access to 
inspection scores, and they behave in a risk averse manner by only frequenting low re-inspection 
priority restaurants for a limited time period following an illness. The percentage of restaurants 
that comply with regulations is increased from 60-90% over multiple simulation runs. Overall, 
the findings were more nuanced: having access to restaurant inspection scores results in a 
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slightly higher mean number of sick consumers, but much less variation overall in the number of 
sick consumers over 100 realizations. In both scenarios, more compliant restaurants results in 
fewer sick consumers.  
Rather than investigating the overlying superstructure of the inspection system, the third model 
investigates the potential for mobile technology to crowdsource information about suspected 
foodborne illness. This model provides a proof of concept for the potential for health-oriented 
mobile technologies to improve the surveillance system for foodborne illness. The model again 
features consumers, retailers and an inspector. Three different scenarios compare the impact of a 
‘sentinel’ population that uses a mobile technology to report mild to moderate symptoms of 
foodborne disease to the inspector, or sensor-based location data of the restaurants they have 
visited, or both. A baseline was determined by running 1000 realizations with no sentinels, 
which was compared to 1000 realizations involving 1%, 2% and 4% sentinels for each scenario. 
The scenario where sentinels report mild to moderate symptoms and visited restaurants showed 
the greatest decline in the number of consumers experiencing mild to moderate illness when 
compared to the baseline, although the scenario where sentinels only reported mild to moderate 
symptoms performed nearly as well. In both cases, increasing the number of sentinels led to 
fewer mild to moderate illnesses. However, the scenario where sentinels only report visited 
restaurants did not effectively reduce the number of mild to moderate cases.  
The three models presented here, although stylized representations of food safety inspection 
systems, provide a number of insights for policy.  
5.2 Policy Implications 
The research presented here discusses a number of policy implications.  
1) ABM has practical use in the policy cycle, particularly in demonstrating possible alternatives 
for policy formulation, which is what the three models in this dissertation have done. Models can 
be used to show a particular problem framing; the three scenarios presented in chapter two 
present food safety as a problem of information asymmetry, and show that greater access to even 
imperfect information can improve outcomes. Models can also be designed to provide a 
counterfactual for policy evaluation; the two scenarios presented in chapter three come close to 
this, as they present the status quo and then an alternative policy option for comparison. By 
92 
 
disclosing restaurant inspection scores to give consumers new information for decision-making, 
this model presents a policy tool that falls under the category of capacity tools (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1990). ABMs could also be used to determine the proper settings for initial policy 
deployment; the scenarios presented in chapter four may be used to inform the design of a pilot 
project, with the results of the pilot providing feedback into model design. A similar method 
could be used in policy development.  
However, applying ABM in policy analysis requires modellers to engage with government, 
consumer, and industry stakeholders. Very few modeling techniques are currently used in policy 
analysis, and unless ABM is made accessible and shown to be useful to policy analysts, it will 
not live up to its potential for use in policy development. In order to achieve broader use by 
governments42 and others outside of the small field of researchers currently using ABM, the 
following elements are needed: 
 Software that allows for drag and drop model building, rather than coding. The current 
software offerings for building ABMs can be intimidating for those without extensive 
experience with coding. To encourage use, software needs to be as simple to use as 
possible.  
 Improved visual analytics. Models that are easy to understand visually, and offer intuitive 
visual results, are easier to communicate to stakeholders and allow models to be used 
effectively as tools for supporting decision-making.  
New software that incorporates the above two elements has the potential to be used more 
extensively for participatory modeling, which could be a useful tool for democratic engagement. 
By involving stakeholders in the modeling process, the results of the modeling process are likely 
to be much richer. As well, there are opportunities for models to be communicated not just from 
researchers down to stakeholders, but for stakeholders to provide direct input on potential policy 
options throughout the modeling process. 
                                                 
42 For example, the Alberta government is interested in threats to the woodland caribou population and assessing the 
risks to herds. A project  at the University of Alberta used an ABM to simulate caribou movement behaviour and 
study the effects of human activity on herds (Hassanali, 2014).  
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2) Fundamentally, all three papers have explored aspects of the role of information in a complex 
system and its impacts on public health policy. In chapter two, the main policy implication is that 
giving consumers and inspectors more information, even if that information is uncertain, results 
in more favourable outcomes. The outcome of having one inspector with access to imperfect 
signalling information is similar to five inspectors using random inspections.  
In chapter three, the results reflect the tension between regulation and information. When 
consumers do not have additional information, and do not exhibit risk averse behaviours 
following an illness by only eating at low re-inspection priority restaurants, the mean number of 
illnesses is somewhat lower. However, when consumers are given access to restaurant re-
inspection priority scores, the mean number of illnesses is somewhat higher, but there is much 
less variation in the overall number of illnesses. This emergent result reflects several important 
points: firstly, it re-emphasizes the complexity of food safety – simply changing one variable is 
not going to fix the problem; secondly, more stable, predictable levels of sickness within the 
population are likely to be more easily managed by the public health system, as wide swings in 
outcomes are unpredictable and may further compound the public’s negative risk perception and 
‘swings from hysteria to indifference’; thirdly, more predictable outcomes that are close to a 
normal distribution are more amenable to typical statistical analyses and could contribute to 
understanding of the problem and future prediction.  
As well, higher levels of restaurant compliance also contribute to fewer sick consumers, and 
empirical evidence indicates that disclosing inspection scores improves compliance. However, 
since the industry has indicated unwillingness to disclose this information voluntarily, 
government action will be required to mandate the posting of scores and encourage a coordinated 
approach across jurisdictions.  
In chapter four, the model results showed that even having a small number of sentinels, or 
individuals within a population that report mild to moderate symptoms to trigger an outbreak, 
can substantially reduce the number of illnesses within a population.  
3) The model results also emphasize ‘what gets measured gets managed.’ This is most apparent 
in chapter four. Although the length of investigation is longer when sentinels only report mild to 
moderate symptoms, fewer people become ill overall, which was an emergent result from the 
94 
 
model. However, this is only obvious since the model shows, very clearly, the total number of 
illnesses; in reality, many illnesses are unreported. Thus, if a health department were to use this 
technology, the reduction in the number of illnesses may not be clear, but the department may 
view the technology as causing inefficiencies in investigations since they now take longer.  
There are also two broader policy implications that come out of using ABM as a policy tool: 
1) The precise documentation required by the ODD framework forces the modeller to be 
transparent and honest about choices made during model specification. All of the modeller’s 
assumptions and data sources must be made clear up front; this is in contrast to econometric 
modeling, where model fitting can be an opaque process that obscures the researcher’s 
assumptions (Leamer, 1983).  
2) Models also hold great value as communicative tools; the software available for implementing 
ABMs, which can allow for visual representation of processes and outputs, greatly facilitates 
communicating models to experts and stakeholders, and, as noted earlier, presents opportunities 
for the broader use of participatory modeling.  
A lot of the potential for modeling comes from models acting as ‘thinking tools’ – the process of 
developing a model to address a problem forces one to think through a number of issues that may 
not be obvious if presented in a less systematic way. The benefit of modeling may not 
necessarily be tied up in the final results of a finished model, but in using the model as a tool for 
thinking through problems and communicating the problem, and potential solutions, to others. 
This allows for easier interdisciplinary collaboration and discussion on complex policy problems. 
The models presented here could be expanded in a number of ways to further explore these 
policy implications or other research questions – a few extensions will be discussed below. 
5.3 Limitations of the Research 
Although the models presented in this thesis have generated some useful insights, their 
limitations cannot be ignored. First, as aptly noted by Epstein (2008), “[A]ll the best models are 
wrong. But they are fruitfully wrong.” The models presented here incorporate numerous 
simplifications and assumptions, as noted in the ODD model descriptions, about human 
behaviour, supply chains, and the level of pathogen exposure required to cause illness, among 
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other things. Further, the models assume that the agents, their actions, and the context in which 
they operate are not all changing interactively at the same time; something that cannot, in all 
fairness, be ruled out. They are stylized models that can generate insight, but should not be used 
for predictive purposes. In order for these models to serve as predictive tools, further data 
collection to inform initial conditions and more sophisticated representations of human 
behaviour, communication, and supply chain dynamics would need to be incorporated.  
Further, the very nature of ABM presents some limitations. The first is that there is often a lack 
of individual-level data to inform models and their assumptions. Although some work is 
underway in this area (M Hashemian et al., 2012), this poses a problem for building grounded 
models. Further, the bottom up nature of ABM makes it difficult to imply top down structures; 
policies are generally top down, so this aspect could limit certain applications of ABM within the 
policy space. However, for policies that intend to affect behaviour of individual actors, ABM 
still holds a lot of promise.  
5.4 Directions for Future Research 
By their very nature, ABMs are extremely flexible. Although this can at times be a disadvantage, 
as a lot of time can be spent adjusting model structure, it is an advantage when it comes to 
extending the models for future research. First, the models presented here could be adapted to 
explore new questions involving: 
 Changes in population structure, such as increased consumer heterogeneity with respect 
to likelihood of illness, more or less dense populations, and agents with more specific 
preferences for the type of restaurant they frequent; 
 Strategies where inspectors cooperate with one another; 
 Different pathogens, for example, different lengths of time between exposure and illness 
or pathogens that can be spread from person to person, not just acquired from a 
contaminated food product; 
 Information sharing between consumers about restaurants to avoid; 
 Restaurants that make explicit optimizing decisions about complying with food safety 
regulations.  
These are just a few examples of possible extensions to the models demonstrated here, and they 
vary in their complexity to implement from very simple to substantial, complicated changes to 
model structure. The models could also be adapted in terms of scale to focus more on federal 
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inspection of meatpacking plants or border control for imported food products. In this case, the 
model would likely involve a more complex supply chain, including processors and distributors. 
Further model development in this vein could be a promising space for hybrid modeling, since 
system dynamics and discrete-event models are well suited to representing supply chains and 
could be integrated with an agent-based model of consumers and inspectors. 
Second, there could be opportunities to work directly with public health officials to adapt models 
specifically to their needs in order to have a real policy impact.  The modeling cycle may be a 
useful tool for building insights and opening dialogue into processes and system outcomes. 
Given that the current climate in health in Saskatchewan is being dominated by LEAN, process 
improvement, and a focus on efficiency to deal with budget pressures, models that could be 
adapted to investigate how changes in processes or staff reductions could affect the overall 
system would be especially useful.  
Third, we have discussed conducting a pilot project with support from the Public Health Agency 
of Canada to investigate the potential for applying mobile technology and crowdsourcing, as in 
the model presented in chapter four.   
One of the difficulties with calibrating ABMs is access to individual data to inform agent 
behaviour in a rich and meaningful way. A fourth extension of the research presented here would 
be to link the models with behavioural experiments to generate results that could better inform 
agent behaviour and decision-making. The advantage of using behavioural experimentation, as 
opposed to surveys and focus groups, is that this method allows for individuals to demonstrate 
what they would do in a given situation, rather than telling the researcher what they would do. 
Data for these experiments thus allows for a more authentic representation of decision-making 
on an individual level. All of these extensions have the potential to further improve the 
applicability of ABM to evidence-based policy-making. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 
The following formula introduces forgetfulness over time. By using a uniform distribution, there 
is between a 5% and 20% chance of the consumer forgetting: 
𝑒−(uniform(0.05,0.2))(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒)  
To determine the probability of a consumer becoming sick per meal, the following stylized facts 
were used:  
 
 Approximately 1 in 8 Canadians become ill each year from foodborne illness (Public 
Health Agency of Canada, 2013). 
 Consumers have been divided into categories based on how frequently they eat in 
restaurants: 6.7% of consumers eat out daily, 30.9% three times a week, and 23% eat out 
once a week (Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association, 2010); the remaining 
39.4% visit a restaurant once every two weeks.  
 Restaurants are responsible for twice as many outbreaks as private homes (Smith DeWaal 
& Glassman, 2014). 
 Most consumers use poor food handling practices while cooking at home (Anderson et 
al., 2004; Redmond et al., 2004); in the model, 80% of the consumers use poor food 
handling practices and 20% use safe food handling practices when cooking at home. We 
assume that consumers who use poor food handling practices are twice as likely to 
contract an illness as those who use safe food handling practices. 
 We also know that, in the model, one out of 100 restaurants is contaminated.  
 Finally, a key assumption is that agents eat one meal per day: this means the per meal and 
per day chance of becoming ill are equivalent. 
 
𝑝 refers to the probability of becoming ill from eating a meal prepared safely at home.  
 
First, we derive the chance of becoming ill from an average home meal, based on the above.  
 
(2 ∗ 0.8 + 1 ∗ 0.2)𝑝 = the chance of becoming ill from an average home meal 
 
Next, we derive the average chance of becoming ill from a restaurant meal, which is twice the 
likelihood of becoming ill from the average home meal.  
 
2(2 ∗ 0.8 + 1 ∗ 0.2)𝑝 = the average chance of becoming ill from a restaurant meal 
 
Next, we determine the weighted average of becoming ill from any restaurant, which we want to 
equal twice the likelihood of becoming sick from a home meal.  We assume that there is no risk 
of becoming ill from a non-contaminated restaurant. 
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𝑝(𝐺𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑖𝑐𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡)
= 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑝 (
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
)
+ (1 − 𝐹𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑)𝑝(
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘
𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
) 
 
Which becomes: 
2(2 ∗ 0.8 + 1 ∗ 0.2)𝑝 =
1
100
∗ 𝑝 (
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
) + 0 
360𝑝 = 𝑝(
𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑘
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑
) 
 
 
 
Now, we know that certain segments of the population eat at restaurants more or less frequently, 
and can use that to determine the overall fraction of meals at restaurants: 
 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = (0.067 ∗
7
7
+ 0.309 ∗
3
7
+ 0.23 ∗
1
7
+ 0.394 ∗
1
14
) 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 0.2604 
 
This means that our overall chance per day of contracting foodborne illness, or ∝, is as follows: 
 
∝= (𝐹ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 ∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠
∗ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠) 
 
We also know that approximately 1 in 8 Canadians become sick each year, so we must use this 
in determining our per day chance of illness:  
 
𝑒−∝𝑡, where 𝑡 refers to 365.25 days.  
The fraction getting sick over a year would be 1 − 𝑒−∝∗365.25 
ln (1 −
1
8
) = −∝∗ 365.25 
∝= −
ln (1 −
1
8)
365.25
 
∝= 2.2688𝑝 
We then use ∝ to solve for 𝑝, the chance of becoming sick per day from a safely prepared home 
meal: 𝑝 = 0.000161138588 
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APPENDIX B: MODEL CODE 
The model code for each of the models used in this dissertation, along with accompanying 
documentation, has been uploaded to the CoMSES Computational Model Library which is 
available at www.openabm.org/models. The interested reader may find the exact links footnoted 
in each of the chapters.  
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